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Within a context of political posturing and intimidation it can become difficult for fruitful discussion 
to emerge and real debate can be stifled. The nationalisation of mines in South Africa is a discussion 
that has been debated in such an environment. The aim of this dissertation is to cut through the 
political posturing and get to the fundamental question surrounding nationalisation of mines in 
South Africa. Would nationalising the South African mining industry enhance its contribution to the 
achievement of poverty and inequality reducing economic growth? This is the central question to 
the debate because the twin objectives of the South African government are to eradicate poverty 
and substantially reduce inequality. 
Given that nationalisation is simply an economic tool that can be used to achieve these objectives, it 
is important to determine whether it would do a better job than the model currently in use. What 
this paper will do is answer that question from a theoretical basis using economic theory and 
statistics of the South African mining industry. 
What this paper will not do is devise a strategy of how the government should move forward -
nationalisation or mere regulation. Though at the end the central question as posited above will be 
answered, and some recommendations on how to make it happen are given, no detailed strategy is 
developed on the way forward. That has been left to other authors, and possibly the government to 
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Nationalisation As An Economic Tool: 
Would nationalising the South African mining industry enhance its contribution to the 
achievement of poverty and inequality reducing economic growth? 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Question 
Would nationalising the South African mining industry enhance its contribution to the achievement 
of poverty and inequality reducing economic growth? 
1.2 Methodology 
This research primarily uses a qualitative method of literature study. The aim is to understand why 
nationalisation has been used as a tool by governments and whether the conditions in South Africa 
would be conducive for a successful nationalisation programme. The dissertation will be mainly 
discursive, presenting both the arguments for and against nationalisation. Some quantitative 
analysis involving production, revenue and employment data is done in order to support the 
qualitative assertions made in the paper. A thorough survey of the literature is conducted, in order 
to understand fully the pertinent issues relating to the nationalization debate in South Africa and 
beyond, and by so doing, address the objectives set out for this research. 
The study uses publications, including academic journals, books and reports that are relevant to the 
subject matter. In addition, some policy documents including government acts and political party 
documents are also used. To ensure the credibility of the information used, articles are sourced from 
peer reviewed journals of a more than satisfactory academic standard. The government documents 
are sourced directly from government websites and/or the government publications section of the 
university library. The quantitative data that is used has been sourced from government publications 
by the relevant government departments. 
1.3 Research Objective 
This dissertation has two primary objectives. The first objective is to investigate the feasibility of 
nationalisation (the process of transferring ownership of a firm or industry from private ownership 
or shareholding to government ownership) as a general strategy for governments by analysing 
different models of nationalisation and how they impact growth and distribution, taking a few case 
studies into consideration to determine the conditions that led to both success and failure of 
nationalisation programmes - here measured by the nationalisation programme's ability to improve 
the economic conditions and reduce poverty if the country in which the programme was 
implemented: if the economy collapsed or slumped for an extended period of time after 
nationalisation then it is considered to have failed. The second objective is to assess whether the 
economic benefits of nationalising the South African mining industry would outweigh the economic 
benefits derived from the mining industry under the current market structure. The African National 
Congress Youth league (ANCYl) position paper on the nationalization of mines will be used as the 
base document from which to evaluate the likelihood of nationalisation to contribute to poverty and 
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be evaluated in comparison to the potential contribution it could make were it to be nationalised. 
This contribution to the economy will be measured by looking at employment figures, employee 
wages, the industry's contribution to the national fiscus, value added and capital formation. The 
ANCYL position paper was chosen as the base document because it sparked the current round of 
debates on Nationalisation, and has the potential to greatly influence the manner in which the 
process would unfold if a nationalisation programme were to be implemented in South Africa. 
1.4 Background 
The four decades between 1950 and 1990 witnessed many failed nationalisation programmes by 
developing nations, followed by a scramble for privatisation and competition for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). While the failure of these projects did not necessarily point to theoretical shortfalls 
in nationalisation as an economic tool (here defined as a way to influence the economy to move in a 
particular direction or to achieve specific goals), they did indicate governments' inability to properly 
put the theory into practice. A closer examination of these failed nationalisation efforts - those that 
led to economic collapse or extended slumps in economic development - offer many lessons that 
require consideration by government economic planners before any new round of nationalisation 
ensues. 
The South African government committed itself to the principles of the free market post democracy 
and has continued to honour that commitment even at times when it seemed that those who 
disagreed with them were in the majority. Nationalisation, though a consistent feature of the South 
African economy, has, by and large, been limited to the provision of services that the market could 
not cater for. The argument against nationalisation has generally been based on the idea that it 
would lead to adverse effects for the economy resulting from capital flight and a major skills 
shortage. Now there are those who believe the time to nationalise has come and the debate is on-
going. 
A debate on nationalisation is raging in South Africa. The debate was sparked by the African National 
Congress Youth League (ANCYL) in 2008. The ANCYL has produced a position paper documenting its 
desire to see the South African mining industry nationalised and the reasons behind it. The 
document (which has solicited much interest within government and the mining industry) is 
comprehensive in parts, but at best imprecise in others, but it warrants consideration because of the 
political weight the ANCYL carries and the implications it would have for the South African economy 
if it were to be adopted by the ANC. 
The ANCYL document gives no reasons for targeting the mining sector specifically for nationalisation. 
The reference by the Freedom Charter ("the statement of core principles of the South African 
Congress Alliance" (ANCYL, 2010)) to the idea that "the mineral wealth ... shall be transferred to the 
ownership of the people as a whole" (Freedom Charter, 1955) has been the foundational reason 
upon which the ANCYL has based its call for nationalising the mining industry. However, the 
Freedom charter calls for the transferral of the ownership of the Banks and all monopoly industries 
to the people as well (Freedom Charter, 1955), and yet the ANCYL has not called for the 











the Freedom Charter reference five other reasons given for nationalising the mining industry, but 
none of them specify which industry should be nationalised in order to achieve those goals. No 
convincing grounds, theoretical or otherwise, are given to prove that nationalising any sector in 
South Africa at the moment would produce better results than those achieved by the structures and 
systems of ownership and the economic strategies currently in place. There is nothing showing how 
the state would increase its fiscal capacity, create more jobs or transform the nation's accumulation 
path (ANCYL, 2009) by nationalising the mining industry; all of which are very important if the case 
for nationalisation is to be considered as an alternative or complimentary model to the status quo. 
What makes these three criteria important is that the combined success in each of these areas 
would lead to poverty reducing, redistributive economic growth. An increased fiscal capacity would 
make it possible for the government to initiate and strengthen poverty reducing initiatives in the 
country. Employment creation would reduce unemployment in South Africa and increase the 
disposable income and/or savings rate of the average South African. Transforming the accumulation 
path would ensure that the majority of the benefits of economic growth in South Africa accrues to 
the poor and reduce inequality. 
Furthermore the ANCYL document is noncommittal on the form of nationalisation that the mining 
industry would be expected to follow: reference is made to a 100 percent public ownership model, 
another model would have government take a 51 percent ownership stake, and a third would take 
the form of partnership arrangements with the private sector (ANCYL, 2009). The failure to describe 
the precise nature of nationalisation - even saying "nationalisation may involve expropriation with 
or without compensation" (ANCYL, 2009) - only increases the likelihood of investment flight as there 
is no certainty about what is to happen in the country. The form of nationalisation (along with the 
value determination method used), payment method and structure, process of nationalisation are 
very important factors that greatly influence the eventual success or failure of nationalisation 
programmes. A definitive description of these factors is a precondition if the policy is to minimize 
uncertainty and create an impression of fairness amongst all stakeholders (Bolton, 1985). 
One insight contained in the ANCYL document addresses the challenges of ensuring an adequate 
supply of minerals within a developmental state. In this regard, the document highlights the failure 
of government legislation to ensure that local demand for minerals, especially that which is for 
developmental purposes, is met before the sale of South Africa's minerals on the international 
markets. Paragraph 24 of the ANCYL position paper (2009) states in it the following, "there is nothing 
that stops them from selling our mineral wealth to the highest bidder in global markets, even if 
national imperatives require that such resources be used to support national development". Though 
a critical insight, the question still remains: is nationalisation the way to remedy the failure of 
mineral producers to prioritise local consumer needs? A further pOint embedded in this question is 
that of the equitable distribution of the benefits derived from the exploitation of mineral resources 
in the country. The issue is not one of whether local industry should be entitled to subsidized input 
prices rather that they get to purchase the quantities they need for developmental purposes at 
competitive prices before any minerals are exported. 
This paper will look at the broad question of nationalisation, but it will take a closer look at the 











flaws. The real contribution of the dissertation will be to investigate whether nationalisation of the 
mining industry is likely to spark a fresh round of growth and development in South Africa or not, 
and make recommendations about what direction the nationalisation debate should take. 
1.5 A Brief History of South African Nationalization 
The recent debate on the nationalisation of the mining sector in South Africa revisits an historic 
concern of the African National Congress (ANC). It's a debate that has taken on a new life given the 
now different context within which the ANC government finds itself. The debate is one that formed a 
big part of national political and economic discourse in the lead up to the 1994 general elections, 
having been sparked by Nelson Mandela just after his release from prison in February 1990 
(Coleman, 1991: 1). On that day, Mandela expressed his support for nationalisation. During those 
early days after his release, the market value of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange fell by R38 billion, 
after having gained R28 billion after De Klerk's speech two weeks earlier announcing Mandela's 
imminent release (Coleman, 1991: 2). Nonetheless, the debate subsequently died down due to a 
variety of factors, some of which will be discussed below. 
In South Africa, nationalisation has been a part of the economy since the 1920's (Coleman, 1991: 2). 
As an economic tool, nationalisation cannot be ascribed to any particular political group nor has it 
been completely rejected by any political group. For example, at some point in the 1990's both the 
ANC and the government under F. W. De Klerk were advocating a mixed economy in South Africa 
(Coleman, 1991: 6). The ANC wanted a socialist-oriented mixed economy (characterised by safety 
nets for the poor and disenfranchised and a descent level of government involvement in the 
economy) and the De Klerk administration wanted a capitalist-oriented mixed economy (Harris, 
1991: 32) (with emphasis on the protection of individual ownership). In the early days of democracy 
in South Africa, opposing camps advocated the use of the same tool (nationalisation) to achieve 
seemingly contrasting objectives - redistribution through common ownership on the one hand and 
development of infant industries characterised by barriers to entry to hand over to the market at a 
later stage on the other hand. Today, an internal debate within the ANC has people in the same 
camp arguing for the use of different tools (nationalisation and regulation) to achieve the same 
objectives. 
1.6 The Current Debate 
This round of debate on whether the South African government should implement a strategy of 
nationalisation, specifically the nationalisation of the mining industry, was sparked by the leadership 
of the ANCYL, as mentioned above. 
The nationalisation of mines, described by the ANCYL as "the democratic government's ownership 
and control of mining activities, including exploration, extraction, production, processing, trading 
and beneficiation of mineral resource" (ANCYL, 2009: 2), is supposed to "help build strategic capacity 
of the state to unlock resources for development and [a] growth path that is more inclusive and 
equitable and does not heavily rely on [the] exportation of primary commodities and [the] 
importation of almost all consumer goods and services" (ANCYL, 2009: 3). Nationalisation of the 
mining industry in South Africa is also being supported by the ANCYL because they are of the view 
that the "democratic state should own and control the production and use of raw minerals in order 
to guarantee the flow of resources to critical sectors in our economy, not in order to maximise 











the government to hold shares in mining companies, be able to determine how they operate and 
determine who South African minerals are sold to. Though some could argue that holding voting 
rights is effectively the same as operational intervention, not being able to control what happens at 
an operational level could lead to a disjuncture between the strategic direction of an entity and what 
managers do at an operational level. 
The ANCYL has based their argument that the ANC ought to begin the process of nationalisation on 
the grounds that the Freedom Charter states that liThe national wealth of our country, the heritage 
of South Africans, shall be restored to the people; The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks 
and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; All other 
industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people" (ANCYL, 2009: 1). This is 
a statement that they say guides ANC policy and is what the party is aiming for in all its actions. 
However, the Charter also says that people will "have equal rights to trade where they choose, 
manufacture and enter all trades, crafts and professions" (Freedom Charter, 1955) which seems to 
support the idea of a free market. Joel Netshitenzhe (2010) in his paper on the question of 
nationalisation points to the idea that some members of the ANC had always known that once SA 
achieved its political freedom, there would be an intense struggle around this very issue of private 
enterprise versus nationalised entities, and that it would ultimately be resolved by the balance of 
forces between the capitalist-oriented and the socialist-oriented cadres of the ANC, precisely 
because the Charter can be interpreted in a number of different ways as indicated. 
The trouble with forwarding an argument on the basis of historic policy positions, without consulting 
current policy documents or surveying the current landscape and its future trajectory, is that the 
ANCYL puts itself at risk of developing irrelevant and inapplicable solutions to current challenges, 
and therefore being unable to achieve the very goals for which they believe themselves to be 
striving - poverty eradication and redistribution of wealth. The idea that the ANC's strategy and 
tactics should be guided solely by the Freedom Charter, a 1955 document, is impractical in an ever 
changing world. Most great organisations have the ability to adapt to their prevailing conditions and 
adjusting their strategy and tactics to suit the hour. There is certainly some advantage to this 
approach. The ANC could better serve the nation if it looked to the Charter for the principles for 
which it stands (poverty eradication and equality for all), but when it comes to devising strategies for 
achieving the goals, account for all the prevailing factors of the day (including the size of the skills 
base, the tax base, investor confidence etc.), look at the balance of evidence so to speak. Economic 
and social analyses must continue to be the guiding tools for government policy and strategy. Once 
poverty is eradicated and equity attained, the very text within the Freedom Charter might become 
out-dated, leaving the ANC as a relic of a struggle gone by unless its policies remain relevant to the 
social and political needs of South Africans. 
The ANCYL argument is reminiscent of Murray's vision of socialism, - "a simple equation: 
nationalisation plus the party" (1987: 88). According to this view, all that is needed in order to 
achieve socialisation is a party composed of workers and representatives of working-class interests. 
This would administer the means of production on behalf of the producers, and nationalise industry. 
The strength of this argument is its simplicity. However, its Simplicity is also its biggest weakness 











does the party adequately represent the interests of the producers or people? Second, even if it 
does, or if some alternative system of popular administration exists, does the formal ownership of 
the means of production give the state and the direct producers' power over the economy (Murray, 
1987: 2)? This view of socialism is too simplistic and impractical. There are more factors to consider 
which materially impact the implementation of a socialist agenda. 
The ANC as an organisation has always altered its strategy and tactics to adapt to its conditions 
without straying from its principles. A scan through ANC policy on the mining industry over the years 
shows that the principle has been the same since 1955, starting with the Freedom Charter. What has 
changed is the strategy used to achieve the goals embedded within the principle. The Freedom 
Charter of 1955 states, "The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall 
be restored to the people; the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry 
shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole" (Jordaan, 2010: 1). The ANC's 
'Ready to Govern' Conference in 1992 concluded: 
"The mineral wealth beneath the soil is the national heritage of all South Africans, 
including future generations. As a diminishing resource it should be used with due 
regard to socio-economic needs and environmental conservation. The ANC will, in 
consultation with unions and employers, introduce a mining strategy which will involve 
the introduction of a new system of taxation, finanCing, mineral rights and leasing" 
(Jordaan, 2010: 1) 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, when it deals with the mining 
industry, specifically states the following: 
"The minerals in the ground belong to all South Africans, including future generations .. 
. Our principal objective is to transform mining and mineral-processing industries to 
serve all of our people. We can achieve this goal through a variety of government 
interventions, incentives and disincentives" (Jordaan, 2010: 2) 
The Mining and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), 2002 asserts that "South Africa's 
mineral and petroleum resources belong to the nation and that the State is the custodian thereof" 
(Ngungunyane, 2010: 2). The 52nd National Conference of the ANC (which took place after the 
adoption ofthe MPRDA) resolved that: 
" ... the use of natural resources of which the State is the custodian on behalf of the 
people, including our minerals, water, marine resources in a manner that promotes the 
sustainability and development of local communities and also realizes the economic and 
social needs of the whole nation" (Ngungunyane, 2010: 3) 
In each of these policy positions put forward by the ANC in the various documents, at various pOints 
in time since 1955, it has maintained that the mineral wealth of South Africa belongs to all South 
Africans, and even going as far as to say that all South Africans includes future generations. Another 
consistent point made is that any policy to be developed for mining in South Africa must ensure that 
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The ANCYL discussion document goes on to state that the 
" ... reasons why the nationalization of mines in South Africa ought to happen include: a) 
A need to increase the state's fiscal capacity and better the working conditions b) it 
would be a basis for industrialization c) it would be a means to safeguard sovereignty d) 
it would be a means to transform the accumulation path in the SA economy and, d) a 
tool to transform SA's unequal spatial development patterns" (2010: 12). 
They then argue that the reason that this cannot happen under the current market and ownership 
structure is the fact that the government revenue collected from taxes is simply not enough to allow 
them to achieve these goals (ANCYL, 2009: 13). The government therefore needs the surpluses from 
the mining industry to be able to make inroads on some of these challenges. 
The other side of the debate could arguably be said to have Joel Netshitenzhe as its lead protagonist. 
Having led and been involved in the policy units of both the ANC and government for so many years, 
he basis his argument on the idea that the interpretation of the "wealth clause" in the Charter has 
changed quite a bit over the last 25 years, citing the ANC's 1992 Ready to Govern and the 2007 
Strategy and Tactics documents to make his case (Netshitenzhe, 2010). Netshitenzhe argues that 
contained in these documents are critical nuanced changes in policy. He says: 
"Firstly, unlike in earlier interpretations of the Freedom Charter, state ownership is not 
posited as the in-principle alternative to all private monopolies: rather, this would be 
informed by the impact such ownership would have on the ability of the economy to 
address poverty and inequality and to encourage growth and competitiveness. 
Secondly, the developmental state should be responsible for enterprises that provide 
public goods such as infrastructure and basic services. Thirdly, the private sector, 
including monopoly capital, is treated not as an enemy, but as a potential partner - and 
yet one that needs to be regulated. Lastly, balance of evidence would inform decisions 
to either increase or reduce the public sector while protecting consumers and workers." 
(Netshitenzhe, 2010: 3) 
Netshitenzhe does not suggest that the ANC would never nationalise, but that there has been a shift 
in the conceptualisation of the strategic objectives of the ANC in relation to the issues of property 
relations (Netshitenzhe, 2010). To him the goals (freedom from poverty, equality for all, common 
ownership of the nation's wealth and the creation of a better life for all) of the ANC have not 
changed, what has changed, from a policy point of view, are the tools (economic or otherwise) to be 
used to achieve those goals, though he does not rule nationalisation out as a possible tool. Simply 
stated, he argues that the context within which the ANC has to make the choice of tool has changed. 
In response to this assertion by Netshitenzhe, Floyd Shivambu (the ANCYL spokesperson) contends 
that Netshitenzhe's views "represent a conservative ideological wave in the ANC ... a wave [that] 
believes that some of the tactical retreats taken upon transition by the ANC-Ied liberation 
movement constituted total capitulation" (Shivambu, 2010: 1). He goes on to contend that the 











that characterised the economic reality of the country in 1955 remain the same today. When the 
Freedom Charter was adopted in 1955 there were "massive inequalities and economic subjugation 
of the black majority and Africans in particular" (Shivambu, 2010: 2), conditions which are still 
prevalent today. 
State ownership is but a means to an end; the end being the achievement of poverty and inequality 
reducing economic growth (Netshitenzhe, 2010). This seems to be the view of most commentators 
who also hold the view that nationalising the mining industry might in fact be a step backwards. Paul 
Jordaan (2010) best captures the sentiment when he states that lithe critical issue would appear to 
be the refinement of a minerals policy and strategy that best assists the ANC in its historic task of 
releasing the productive forces for growth and development in order to create jobs, combat poverty 
and give the poor and dispossessed a better life" (Jordaan, 2010: 1). Therefore, when one looks at 
the question of nationalising any industry, it is important to determine whether state ownership 
would enhance that industry's ability to contribute to the achievement of poverty and inequality 
reducing economic growth. 
When it comes down to nationalising the mining industry in particular, Netshitenzhe (2010) asks the 
same question about its ability to contribute to economic growth. In addition to that question, he 
also asks if there are cheaper, less risky ways of getting the mining industry to assist the government 
in achieving its economic objectives. Netshitenzhe (2010) asks whether it is possible to assess if 
nationalising the mines would necessarily be the best way of achieving the government's economic 
objectives in the absence of a clear plan of action for each of the goals stated by the ANCYL -
increasing the state's fiscal capacity, transformation of the accumulation path, job creation and 
improved working conditions, and safeguarding SA's sovereignty (ANCYL, 2009: 12). "In a nutshell, 
the call for holus bolus 'nationalisation of the mines' is not supported by strong enough evidence" 
(Netshitenzhe, 2010: 11). Another important matter to address is whether one economic tool 
(nationalisation) can be used to achieve all of these stated objectives. If so, how can this be done 
and are there any conflicts that could arise. A more thorough assessment needs to be done in order 
to better make the case for nationalisation in South Africa. 
Over and above the absence of 'strong enough evidence' (the objective measure of which is not 
clearly defined), Netshitenzhe also argues that natural resource companies 'have high "lootabilityllJ 
(Netshitenzhe, 2010: 11), that is, they tend to lend themselves to corruption (Netshitenzhe, 2010). 
This would make the state's economic plans for the industry vulnerable and subject to the integrity 
of individuals, in the absence of proper systems, and checks and balances. On this point there is 
some agreement. The ANCYL says that the mismanagement, patronage and criminality that 
characterises State owned enterprises is due to the fact that they have livery weak accountability 
systems" (Shivambu, 2010: 3). The disconnection exists around the question of how to resolve that 
particular problem. Where Netshitenzhe (2010) favours the option of leaving the industry to the 
market, the ANCYL (2010) is of the view that a good legislative framework and proper definitions (no 
criteria is put forward as to what constitutes a proper definition) of the extent of the interventions 
the state can make will improve the state's ability to root out mismanagement, patronage and 
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the debate, makes a clear analysis of which of the positions is stronger than the other difficult to 
make. More clarity on what is meant by Netshitenzhe and by the ANCYL is necessary to make 
judgement possible. 
Where the ANCYL, and those who support its position, seem to focus all the attention on is the 
principle that the ANC has always been in support of nationalisation of the mines, and other sectors, 
and that the government would be well within its right to follow through with the strategy. 
Netshitenzhe and those who see things his way are of the view that though the ANCYL may be right 
on the issue of principle, it is impractical to call for the nationalisation of the mines at this stage -
given the balance of evidence. 
Those who support nationalisation say they do so because the strategies that have been 
implemented thus far have failed to benefit the nation as a whole, only enriching a select few that 
make up the Black middle class. The liANe's efforts to transfer wealth to the ownership of the people 
as a whole have not been adequate to decisively break the racial, class and gender dialectic of 
colonial-cum-apartheid repression" (Shivambu, 2010: 1). They argue that Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) has not increased the well-being of the people (COSATU, 2010), that lithe 
broader thrust of the Freedom Charters objective for the people to share the country's wealth has 
not been attained" (Shivambu, 2010: 1), and that nationalisation is the only way that the benefits 
can accrue to all the people of South Africa. Essentially, what is being argued is that all tools that 
have been used to transfer wealth to the ownership of the people as a whole have thuse far failed to 
achieve this goal. A goal which is itself not clearly defined. What would the South African economy 
look like once ownership has been transferred? What will the defining features of an economy in 
which all wealth is shared? The absence of answers to these questions makes the goal somewhat 
intangible and almost unachievable. 
Coupled with the concern that current policy has not achieved the goals of the Charter is the 
concern that private monopolies in South Africa behave in a manner which does not aid the 
government in achieving these goals. The behaviour of companies like Tiger-Brands and those 
involved in the bread cartel (COSATU, 2010), though punishable and punished by the Competition 
Commission and Tribunal, have resulted in almost irreversible damage to the economy and the 
people. The bread cartel in South Africa colluded to keep bread prices artificially high in order that 
they could take in super profits at the expense of proper competition in the bread market, and 
therefore a loss of efficiency within the economy (ceteris paribus). As a result, if the government is 
to be able to direct the trajectory of the economy, it must own and control the commanding heights 
of the economy so as to use its monopoly power to improve the social conditions of all South 
Africans instead of profit taking by a few members of the society. 
What seems to be of priority to those members of the ANC who oppose the nationalisation of mines 
at this stage, is whether or not it will achieve poverty and inequality eradicating economic growth. 
Ngungunyane in his article concludes by saying "it doesn't matter whether a cat is white or black, as 
long as it catches mice" (Ngungunyane, 2010: 5), thereby streSSing the point that regardless of 
whether nationalisation (which seeks to ensure that government runs and owns the entire mining 
process in South Africa) or the MPRDA (which gives the government some power to determine the 
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chosen as the instrument for achieving the Freedom Charter's objective of restoring the wealth of 
the nation to the people, what is important is to ensure that the chosen instrument will actually 
achieve the goal. Matters of revolutionary theory and posturing may only result in the side-tracking 
of government and the ANC. Ngungunyane argues against nationalisation on the grounds that the 
MPRDA has achieved three goals of the charter without destabilising the mining industry and 
derailing the economy (Ngungunyane, 2010). 
The gist of the argument against nationalising the mines seems to be that the objectives of the 
Freedom Charter can be achieved by a "variety of policies, strategies and instruments without 
necessarily nationalising the mining operations ... [that] there are far more effective ways of 
achieving substantial development impacts from a country's mineral assets than by the state simply 
taking ownership of mining companies" (Jordaan, 2010: 4); options that are yet to be explored. 
Those against nationalisation are in substance asking the question of efficiency. There seems to exist 
some doubt on whether a nationalised mining industry would be able to run as well as, or better 
than a privately owned one, and in that way make the mining industry a better contributor to the 
attainment of preset goals of the government. Some point to the fact that so many of the state 
owned entities have failed to be efficient and are in fact a drain on the government budget. This is 
countered by the ANCYL in the following manner: 
" ... all the state owned enterprises that are said to have failed were purely run on 
private sector principles, wherein progress and success is measured as per the profit 
margins, instead of concrete developmental outcomes such as employment creation 
and infrastructure investments ... contribution to socio-economic development and 
assistance of communities" (Shivambu, 2010: 3) 
They go on to argue that "efficiency of enterprises is not a function of shareholding, but a 
consequence of a variety of both subjective and objective conditions under which businesses 
operate" (Shivambu, 2010: 4). This assertion can be countered by the argument that in most listed 
companies there is a separation of powers because the managers are not the owners of the 
company, thereby ensuring scrutiny and accountability. State owned entities will only become as 
efficient as privately owned companies if this separation of powers can effectively be achieved, 
when managers of State owned entities cannot be unduly influenced and are held accountable by 
those in power. The fundamental flaw of the ANCYL argument in this regard is the implicit 
assumption that private enterprises and their profit motive by design conflict with developmental 
goals. An entity run on the basis of profit generation can create as many, if not more jobs (a desired 
outcome) than one whose focus is on some or other developmental goal. Profit focused state 
enterprises can themselves contribute to development as much as other state owned enterprises. 
That which makes private enterprises different from state enterprises is the people to whom the 
fruits of labour (in this case profit) accrue. What the ANCYL fails to address is the core question 
surrounding the failure of most state owned enterprises, and it does so by blaming the profit motive 











1.7 South African Nationalization Debate: Past and Present 
The key difference between the nationalisation debate today and that of the early nineties is the 
focus of the two debates. Whereas in the early nineties leaders within the ANC were not really sure 
what they wanted to nationalise, having wanted simply to follow the strategy as a general approach 
to governance, the ANCYL today has picked a specific industry to be targeted for nationalisation. 
After Mandela's release from prison it was not uncommon for leaders of the ANC and COSATU to 
issue statements like 'nationalisation would be an essential part of the reconstruction programme of 
(a democratic) state' (Coleman, 1991: 6), but there did not seem to exist a predetermined set of 
industries that were believed to be crucial to the survival of the state. The ANCYL on the other hand 
has chosen the mining industry as a clear target of nationalisation and have listed a couple of 
reasons that are more specific than just the survival ofthe state. 
A second difference between the debate on nationalisation today and that of the early nineties is 
the camps on the opposite sides of the debate. In 1990, the structures that formed part of the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM) - ANC, COSATU, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) - formed a block on one side with the National Party government of 
De Klerk on the other side. Today, among the major political organisations, the ANCYL and COSATU 
favour nationalisation, while the ANC, the Young Communist League (YCL) and SACP firmly oppose it. 
The debate seems to be dominated by sister organisations within the MDM on either side, each 
seemingly unmovable from their positions. Those who argue for nationalisation and those arguing 
against it back their arguments up using quotations from the same documents, and in some cases 
even quoting the same words. The differences are simply a matter of interpretation. The current 
nationalisation debate can be said to have people who believe in achieving the same goals on either 
side of its fence, people who only seem to disagree on the question of how those goals should be 
achieved. 
If all parties can agree that nationalisation is simply one tool in a box of many that can be employed 
to achieve equitable economic growth that leads to poverty eradication, then what is important is to 
determine is how effective a tool it is and whether it is the best tool available to the nation given the 
current conditions. 
2 Nationalisation Literature Review 
2.1 Capitalism, Socialism and Nationalisation 
"For many years capitalism was defined in terms of two key elements: private 
ownership of the means of production, and the existence of wage labour. These 
conditions gave rise to the existence of surplus value, which, in the hands of capitalists, 
became capital. From this sprang a definition of socialism, as the expropriation of the 
capitalists and the transfer of the means of production into common ownership. No 
longer would surplus labour be appropriated by capital as profit. It would now exist as a 
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Socialism from its roots has been defined and viewed as the antithesis of capitalism, and been 
projected as an alternative to it. Marx and Engels (1967: 79) view capitalism as a system built upon 
class struggle, and only existing so long as that struggle persists between the oppressors and the 
oppressed - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat - with the oppressors being a minority working only 
to secure and fortify their own interests at a cost to the majority (Marx and Engels, 1967: 92). The 
bourgeoisie "has agglomerated population, centralised means of production, and has concentrated 
property in a few hands" (Marx and Engels, 1967: 85). Socialism on the other hand is a system 
seeking to equalise everyone in society, giving to labour a wage that is only what it requires for the 
"maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command 
the labour of others" (Marx and Engels, 1967: 97). Socialism therefore seeks to provide all members 
of society, both labourers and former bourgeoisie, with equal stakes in the means of production and 
the surpluses thereof. 
There are various ways in which past governments have attempted to achieve socialism to varying 
degrees of success. The economic tool most commonly associated with the process of socialism is 
nationalisation. In The Communist Manifesto Karl Marx refers to the "use of political supremacy (by 
the proletariat) to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of 
production in the hands of the State" (1967: 104) as the second step in the revolution by the 
working class towards the attainment of socialism. In their quest for the attainment of socialism, 
most self-proclaimed socialist governments have found themselves with a limited number of tools 
available to them that they could use to wrest all capital from the business elite - the one tool that 
most of these governments turn to is nationalisation, hence its close association to socialism. The 
use of nationalisation for the implementation of doctrine by the ruling class is the reason it is so 
closely associated with particular schools of thought (Rood, 1977: 490). This has led to 
nationalisation being associated with social change. Lenin for instance assumed that nationalisation 
would replace conflict and competition - conditions associated with private enterprise - with co-
operation (Coleman, 1991: 7). What this attempts to achieve is the use of an economic tool to 
implement ideology, and as history has shown, this strategy has had limited success. 
Nationalisation cannot be said to belong to communists (or socialists), or to have been invented by 
them. It predates communism by several thousand years, having been used in ancient Babylon, 
Rome and Greece (Coleman, 1991: 1). As a legal concept, nationalisation first appeared in the 
constitution of Mexico and in the first decrees of the USSR after 1917 (Bolton, 1985: 2). Given the 
above, it is thus useful to ask the question, "What is nationalisation?" 
Narrowly defined, nationalisation is simply the process of transferring ownership of industries and 
business to government. Nationalisation is just another economic tool that can be used to achieve 
certain goals and objectives like other known economic tools - private ownership, floating exchange 
rates, inflation targeting, government set interest rates and so forth. It is an accepted economic 
concept and tool that can be used to prevent or correct market failure. State ownership, as Lipsey 
and Chrystal (2007: 282) point out, is the obvious remedy for situations where goods and services 
cannot be provided by private firms - as is the case with public goods. 
Though nationalisation is Simply state ownership, there are those who argue that there should be 
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with more than just ownership, that it must aim to achieve communal prosperity in the material, 
cultural and moral dimensions. The trouble with this view is that it attempts to make nationalisation 
a synonym for socialism, something it is not. This is not to say that nationalisation cannot be used to 
achieve goals with a socialist spin, e.g. redistribution of income, only that it should not be taken to 
mean socialism. 
2.2 Neo-Nationalisation 
What was new about nationalisation as it appeared in the 20th century was its attitude towards 
property. The new view was that all of or part of the means of production would be used in the 
interest of society as a whole, and not that of individuals. Nationalisation would therefore be used as 
a means of removing the means of production from private ownership and make them communal 
property (Bolton, 1985: 2). It is only in the 20th century that nationalisation was first used to achieve 
Marx's second step of the revolution (transferring the ownership of capital to government to serve 
as the custodian for the people) - we have, for the purposes of this paper, termed this Neo-
nationalisation. It is this view of nationalisation that has turned it into a synonym for socialism, one 
that has led to its abuse in some parts and underuse in others. It is this same view of nationalisation 
that has led to the widespread and commonly held belief that it is an alternative to the market 
system instead of being seen as a complement to it. It is made to appear as though a company that 
is owned by the government (Le. nationalised) does not have to respond to market signals. 
"Nationalisation ... and state intervention may be necessary means for socialist ends, but it [is] 
clear, such means may also be employed for capitalist ends" (Coleman, 1991: 8). Nationalisation can 
work hand-in-hand with the market system to achieve results that could otherwise not be possible 
within either of the systems in isolation of one another. The use of nationalisation to develop infant 
industries with increasing economies of scale considered crucial for the state, but facing financial 
barriers of entry due to large upfront investments is an example of the potential power of using the 
market system and nationalisation as complements. 
Nationalisation as a policy tool has been used frequently and widely by many governments to 
achieve both political and economic objectives (Bolton, 1985: 1). 
"It is perhaps theoretically possible to recognise the dichotomy between states using 
nationalisation policy as an integral part of a socialist strategy - legitimised by organiC 
laws instituted towards this end; and states which have used 'ad hoc' nationalisation 
strategies for different reasons. These latter states have, on the whole, both retained 
their respect for, and their commitment to private enterprise. Nationalisation within 
this context usually represents a strategy aimed at repairing or consolidating a capitalist 
economy" (Bolton, 1985: 2). 
Indeed nationalised industries are commonplace. Nationalisation can and has been used by 'pro-
capitalist' governments (Coleman, 1991:8) and 'pro-socialist' governments. Like most economic 
tools, it is only a means to an end, not an end in itself. For any economic tool to be effective it is 
important that it be used in the correct manner, within the correct setting and at the correct time. 
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2.3 Nationalisation as a Tool 
As an economic tool, nationalisation is often employed in industries that provide public goods or in 
industries that are characterised by significant externalities - positive or negative. The reason is the 
fact that some needs are not market based and do not respond to market signals and incentives 
(Coleman, 1991: 4). As a result, nationalisation has been used to address a number of economic 
anomalies that are not catered for by the market and its forces. These anomalies include uneven 
wealth distribution, uneven spatial development, the abuse of monopoly power, cushioning the 
undesirable impacts of economic collapse and the development of strategic industries not prioritised 
by private capital- thus making it a useful tool for addressing both social and inefficiency challenges. 
It could be said that nationalisation is a useful tool in parts of the economy where the market 
mechanism is dysfunctional (Coleman, 1991: 9). Areas like education, health, public transport, 
welfare, street lighting; industries with high social value, but little profitability from a balance sheet 
point of view (Coleman, 1991: 10). 
Its main appeal to governments is the strength it possesses as a policy tool. Governments can more 
readily use nationalised industries to achieve their economic and political goals. Nationalisation can 
be used to counter short-term business cycle problems and address more long-term development 
challenges (Coleman, 1991: 10-11). For the latter, governments have tended to nationalise essential 
goods and services industries whose products tend to be used as inputs in a lot of other industries 
within the economy. This is done in order to ensure that the supply of these goods and services is 
readily available for the development of the industries that rely on them, and control the 
development pattern that the government wishes to see (Coleman, 1991: 28). The economic 
argument for nationalising major companies is premised on the idea that in order to reshape the 
economy the state needs to gain control of certain sectors because they influence everything else, 
and in order to control them it is necessary to own them (Harris, 1991: 33). This alone should make it 
clear that nationalisation can be a high risk strategy for government (Coleman, 1991: 34). Taking 
over the essential goods and services industries within the economy implies that government takes 
charge of the very foundation of the economy and is placed in a position to determine its future 
direction. If anything is to go wrong, the entire economy can potentially collapse. As a result it is 
advisable that before nationalising any of the commanding heights of the economy, the government 
determines whether it or the private sector is better positioned to ensure the success and continued 
development of those parts of the economy in accordance with its desired goals. 
In the 1960s and 1970s a lot of governments of developing countries nationalised mining firms 
(Auty, 1997: 4) in the belief that it would give them greater control of the development path of their 
economies. This desire for greater control plus the fact that there was an unacceptable level of 
revenue leakage (the result of capital service charges, expatriate salaries, expenditure of local wages 
and salaries on imported goods etc.) to the industrialised nations where the headquarters of the 
multi-national mining companies were (Auty, 1997: 32) led to the conviction that nationalisation was 
the only way to correct the problem. Though South Africa is not really characterised by such 
leakages, the mining industry in South Africa is very much still at the primary level. Minerals are 
mined in the country and shipped to overseas destinations with little to no beneficiation or value-
add. There is potential to develop secondary and tertiary industries around the mining of minerals in 
South Africa. Many factors ensured the failure of nationalised mining companies in most of the 
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direct investment in the 1980s and 1990s. Auty (1997) is of the view that the overarching reason for 
the failure of the government owned mining companies was the rigidity of their responses to 
changing market conditions, which lead to inefficiencies. Be that as it may, the failure of these 
nationalised entities and the subsequent collapse of the economies in which they were based pOints 
to the possible perils of nationalisation. When any industry is chosen to be the lead industry for a 
country's development it is bound to become quite intrinsically linked to the rest of the industries in 
the economy. This makes it difficult to diversify the economy, increasing the risk of collapse. Where 
mineral resources are concerned, there are too many external factors involved with the pricing and 
demand for minerals that governments (especially those of developing countries) have no control 
over which makes their economies even more vulnerable to shocks. 
2.4 The Commanding Heights 
The concept of the commanding heights was introduced to the nationalisation vocabulary by the 
British Labour Party in 1945. The commanding heights were companies that fit a list of criteria used 
to assist the party to determine which companies occupied the most strategic positions in the 
economy; the companies that, if nationalised, would ensure that the government's attempts to steer 
the economy in a particular direction would be successful (Coleman, 1991: 27). The commanding 
heights concept helps ensure that governments don't just nationalise any big company or monopoly 
even if it will have no strategic advantage in the determination of the economy's developmental 
pattern. "The commanding heights approach reveals the difference between nationalising what is 
strategic and what is big" (Coleman, 1991: 35) 
The important characteristics of a commanding height are the functions, operations, and linkages of 
the company. In addition to these, another characteristic that could warrant the possible 
nationalisation of a business would be the proportion of the finance available for investment 
throughout the economy that it commands (Harris, 1991: 34). The higher it is, the more likely it is to 
be nationalised. A final consideration for the classification of a company as a commanding height 
would be the level of its involvement in the employment of labour in the economy (Harris, 1991: 34). 
A company or industry that employs a large portion of the economy's labour is more likely to be 
considered for nationalisation. 
Opting to nationalise the commanding heights of an economy tends to lead to the nationalisation of 
fewer, but better chosen targets (Coleman, 1991: 36). By pinpointing the commanding heights of the 
economy, the hope is to gain control of the key points in the economic chain. The point is that every 
company is part of a much wider circuit of capital. Every circuit tends to have a dominant point 
which could allow those who control that point to siphon off excess profits from the entire circuit -
these points (companies) are the commanding heights (Murray, 1987: 89). Limitations to the scope 
of publicly owned industry arise from the fact that key elements of control reside elsewhere 
(Murray, 1987: 92-3) - outside the local economy - which may lead to public firms effectively being 
controlled by private monopolies or forces outside the nationalising government. That is the reason 
identifying the right companies as the commanding heights is important. A nationalising government 
using the commanding heights approach must be forward looking in order to ensure that the parts 
of the economy that are nationalised will remain the key linkages in the economy, and keep the 
government as the motor of growth, otherwise the "government may well end up entrenching dead 
weight as the centre of the economy, and the most backward parts of the economy as the centre of 
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dominant points of the circuit, then it will be able to exercise control over the rest of the circuit 
(Murray, 1987: 90). To gain control of the key pOints the government can explore a number of 
options, one of which is nationalisation. What is important to note is the fact that, by this argument, 
the rest of the economy must be left to private enterprise where individual entrepreneurs respond 
to market signals (Coleman, 1991: 8), thereby using nationalisation as a complement to the market 
economy, and not an alternative or antithesis. 
The true weakness of the commanding heights approach is that at its core is a motive that can never 
be fully defined, and therefore tends to be difficult to achieve. At its core, nationalising the 
commanding heights is an attempt to obtain control of the national economy, as has been stated, 
and nationalising industries for this reason has tended to lead to the destruction of economies 
(Rood, 1977:489) as a result of the wrong industries being nationalised or the failure of those 
industries after they become state owned industries. 
2.5 The Efficiency Question 
Those who have criticised nationalisation as an economic tool have done so on the basis that 
nationalised industries are inevitably inefficient or prone to corruption. The theoretical basis of the 
inefficiency criticism is the rationale that only the profit motive can stimulate businesses to produce 
at minimum costs. This theory is significantly weakened by two important facts: first, theories on 
modern firms suggest that they do not operate in either a profit maximising or cost minimizing 
manner; second, nationalised industries can be structured in a way that induces cost minimisation 
which would be an efficient manner of operating (Harris, 1991). However, the argument against 
nationalised industries can be strengthened by the argument that they have not generally been 
profitable - if we assume that profitability is the correct measure of efficiency. Unfortunately there 
are a number of factors that can impact on profitability that are not necessarily efficiency enhancing. 
Artificially high prices resulting from monopoly power and/or abusively low wages resulting from an 
imbalance of power in the economy are two examples, neither of which makes one firm more 
efficient or more productive than the next (Harris, 1991: 35). Efficiency should surely be measured 
by the rate at which a good or service is safely produced and delivered to its intended consumers 
with minimum leakages and at the lowest possible cost to the producer. 
An interesting idea to consider at this stage is that of "X-efficiency" (Leibenstein, 1966: 392). The 
idea that the welfare gains from increasing only allocative efficiency brought about by changes in the 
market structure tend to be negligible, what is important is the X-efficiency whose major element is 
motivation (Leibenstein, 1966: 394). What this suggests is that the welfare gains from changing the 
South African mining industry from one that is dominated by a few big firms to a competitive 
industry would most likely be exceedingly small. The reason the welfare effects of reallocation are so 
small is that allocational inefficiency involves only the net marginal effects so what is left is merely 
the consequences of price and quantity distortions (Leibenstein, 1966: 397). The one distortion that 
market structures could correct that could lead to major welfare gains is the allocation of managers. 
Certain market structures force (or incentivise) managers to work in such a way that they reduce 
costs by significant amounts by re-organising the production processes of their firms (Leibenstein, 
1966: 397). The basic story there is "that changes in incentives will change productivity per man (and 
cost per unit of output)" (Leibenstein, 1966: 401). The relation of this idea to nationalisation is the 
manner in which nationalising the mining industry would alter the incentive scheme of managers 
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profit maximization is the only way they can guarantee the success of their business and their 
continued employed, to those who can reliably depend on the government to subsidise any losses 
that the companies could incur, certainly leading to a decline in welfare for South Africa. 
Nationalised industries (industries owned by government for whatever reason) will themselves be 
subject to market pressures - even if it is the most basic ones like demand and supply - that can 
force them to behave in a manner resembling private enterprises. This is most likely to happen if the 
objectives of the nationalised industries are not altered to achieve social goals - which can be left to 
various government departments. If the overriding objective remains profit maximisation, then the 
response of the nationalised industries to market forces will be to take on the form of state 
capitalism (Murray, 1987: 93). This implies that nationalised companies with a profit motive can be 
as profitable as privately owned companies, even though the ownership structure would be 
different. If they are indeed as profitable as private firms, the result would simply be a claiming by 
the government of profits that would otherwise be appropriated by capitalists. However, in order for 
this to hold true, the conditions have to be exactly right with the separation of powers between 
managers and owners and clear lines of accountability for both groups. Unfortunately experience up 
to this point suggests that public companies are never able to be as profitable as privately owned 
entities. As much as most socialists would choose to believe that capitalists U[act] to control labour, 
speed up production, and press down on wages because they [are] innately oppressive" (Murray, 
1987: 93) or just plain evil, the truth of the matter is that they do what they do as a response to the 
pressures within the markets in which they operate. Failure to do so would see them disciplined by 
the market and any nationalised company with a profit and capital accumulation motive would itself 
be subject to the same forces. The question is whether firms under state ownership do as well as 
those that are not. 
Nationalised companies and industries will find themselves operating in and against the market 
(Murray, 1987: 96) which will result in pressures on those entities to adopt market criteria for their 
operations. This pressure tends to be more pronounced in cases where nationalisation is used to 
achieve goals that conflict with capital accumulation - increased wages, improved working 
conditions, increased flexibility of working time, industrial democracy, enterprise planning (Murray, 
1987: 94) - basically social goals. This is not to say that nationalised entities whose goals conflict 
with the laws of capital accumulation will necessarily fail to achieve their objectives. Rather the 
success of nationalised entities must be measured using criteria related to whatever the objectives 
of those entities are. What ought to be judged is the efficiency of the nationalised companies in 
achieving its stated goal(s), whatever it (they) may be. The challenge that they are likely to face, and 
must be addressed is that of sustainability. If these entities do not respond to market pressures 
accordingly (by becoming more efficient in every way) then they are likely to collapse. 
The attraction of the nationalised entity, as mentioned earlier, is its ability to bestow economic 
power on the government. This economic power, once transferred to governments, has tended to 
be used to pursue conflicting goals. Governments have a tendency to use nationalised entities to 
achieve political and social goals, as well as purely economic goals, which typically clash (Aron, 1992: 
3). This can lead to the failure of the nationalised company because it lacks direction, a result of the 
lack of clear objectives, or at the very least, an order of importance for the different objectives. A 
decision has to be reached about which objective is to be prioritised over the other objectives. Just 
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nationalisation must have its primary objective defined if it is to succeed in any country. That said, 
even an overriding objective might not be enough to ensure success. A big element of the market 
that ensures discipline is the realistic possibility of failure when a firm is not competitive. 
Government owned companies have fall back pOSitions in the form of subsidies, cheap credit and 
protective state employment regulation which reduce the pressure on the managers of these 
entities to ensure success. 
2.6 Other Challenges of Nationalisation 
A bigger challenge faced by governments and the their nationalised companies is that of ensuring 
that the managers of those companies understand the goals of the nationalised industry and set up 
their operations to suit the new policy objectives. The absence of technical managers who are willing 
to implement the policies of a nationalising government (or any other new owner) is one of the most 
serious constraints to the attainment of the government's objectives (Murray, 1987: 99). Managers 
have the power to determine the everyday operations and strategy of the business, and therefore 
have the ability to chart the path the company follows. These managers have the power to either 
champion or frustrate the achievement of government goals. Questions arise around how the 
government can ensure that managers put its policies into practice, and what checks and balances 
ought to be implemented to keep managers sailing the now government owned ship in the direction 
the government wishes to see it go (Murray, 1987: 97) without exerCising undue political influence. 
Should the government employ new managers from their own ranks who understand and believe in 
the ideology? Can the companies cope with the loss of the experienced managers? Should company 
level strategies be set by government with only their implementation left to the managers? The 
answers to these questions surely depend on the particular case. In South Africa there has been 
much talk about the ANC's policy of cadre deployment, suggesting that in this country, the preferred 
solution to this problem is the appointment of managers from within the ranks of the ruling party, 
making the idea of a separation of powers within the business sector very difficult to achieve. 
Aron's study of problems encountered by the Zambian copper industry after nationalization is 
informative in this regard; she argues that the design of an appropriate government-enterprise 
control relationship is especially important (Aron, 1992: 2). These controls tend to be a key 
determinant of whether the enterprise management will act in a manner that has the best interest 
of the enterprise or not. This is a way for government and management to define how the 
shareholder-manager relationship will function going forward to ensure the efficient and reliable 
functioning of the nationalised company. Cooperation amongst the various stakeholders better 
positions the company for success (Aron, 1992: 42). The cooperation must be coupled with a clear 
monitoring mandate that amounts to comprehensive oversight of the nationalised entities and is not 
influenced by political leaders. The reason comprehensive oversight is important is that "weak 
oversight facilitates corruption, diminished transparency and allows increased political manipulation 
of the company" (Aron, 1992: 43). 
2.7 Nationalisation: An Economic Tool 
Having established nationalisation as a genuine economic tool, it is important to discuss what goals 
it can be used to achieve. If inflation targeting is used to ensure low inflation and price stability, what 
is nationalisation used for? Better yet, what can nationalisation be used for? There are a number of 
things that nationalisation can be used to achieve, one of which has been touched upon - the 
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considered to be the overall objective of any form of government intervention. The various reasons 
given for nationalisation tend to be variations on this central theme. What things does the market 
consistently get wrong that lead to the use of nationalisation as an economic tool? 
Nationalisation can be used to ensure a more equal wealth distribution (Coleman, 1991: 9). There 
are two main ways in which wealth can be equally distributed through nationalised entities; the first 
is by simply taking the profits of the nationalised business and distributing them equally across the 
population, or giving the poorer people in the population a greater share until there is equal 
distribution. The second is through prices. A nationalised entity can choose to reduce the prices of 
goods and services mainly bought by lower income earners (Coleman, 1990: 9) and in that way free 
up some of their income for other things. 
A second reason to nationalise is the prevention of unequal spatial development. The proceeds from 
nationalised entities can be ring fenced and specifically directed at the development of areas that 
would otherwise remain underdeveloped as a result of historical patterns of development. This can 
also ensure that the population distribution also remains even, instead of seeing the concentration 
of people around specific places. Nationalisation can also prevent the uneven distribution of 
populations by ensuring that goods and services are provided at affordable prices in areas the 
market might deem too expensive to venture into (Coleman, 1991: 9). 
A third reason for nationalisation is to ensure the continuing functioning of industries which are 
regarded as essential or strategically important which might not meet the profit criteria of the 
market (Coleman, 1991: 10). Essential industries could be industries that produce goods that are 
inputs to many other industries in the economy, inputs without which those industries could not 
function. Electricity in South Africa today can be seen as an essential industry. Strategic industries 
tend to be those that have to do with the nation's security, e.g. nuclear power. 
2.8 Determinants of Success 
Some of the factors that contribute to the eventual success of nationalisations across the world 
include the process of acquisition (how the nationalised entities are acquired by the nationalising 
government - grabbed, bought or negotiation), how the value of the acquired companies is 
established, how the companies are paid for, the source of the finance and the timing of the 
nationalisation (Coleman, 1991: 41). 
Nationalisations that have succeeded have been those that were negotiated (Coleman, 1991: 57) in 
a process that included all the stakeholders with an interest in the process, and the end result has 
been general agreement on the terms of the nationalisation. Stakeholders that are likely to have an 
interest in a process of nationalisation include the nationalising government, workers in the target 
enterprise, the management of the target enterprise, consumers of the products or services 
produced by target enterprise, input suppliers of the target enterprise and the soon to be former 
owners of the target enterprise (Coleman, 1991: 97). The management of these stakeholders tends 
to become a central determinant of success. Nationalisation can also be one of another three types; 
confiscation, classic and partial nationalisation (Coleman, 1991: 82). 
The value of the target enterprise can be established using one of three methods; market value, 
book value or book value less depreciation and other deductions (Coleman, 1991: 69) which can be 
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value of the target entities can be made in a number of forms. It can be done in foreign currency or 
local currency, it can be made immediately (every cent paid) or over an agreed upon timeframe at 
an agreed upon rate of interest. Each one of these decision will impact on the possible success of 
nationalisation as using anyone of these methods increases or decreases the cost of nationalisation. 
A major factor that will contribute to the success of nationalisation, especially in today's context, is 
the response of the business community to the call for nationalisation. The response of the business 
community is by and large shaped by the perception of fairness and effectiveness of the 
nationalisation. It is also affected by the method or nationalisation and the response of the 
international community to the nationalisation (Coleman, 1991: 82). Ensuring that the business 
community buys into the nationalisation process is important because they are generally the 
customers and input suppliers of the target enterprises so their response directly impacts the 
operations of the target entities. 
All of the above mentioned determinants of success will contribute to the perception of the 
nationalisation programme by the business community and therefore their response to it. 
Conducting the process in a manner that is seen to be fair and legal increases the probability of 
success for a nationalisation programme of any kind. 
3 Economics of Depletion 
3.1 Introduction 
The nationalisation question in South Africa is currently focused on the mining industry. For that 
reason, it is important to contextualise any question about the feasibility of nationalisation in South 
Africa within the study of un-renewable resources, and the economics of depletion. The 1931 article 
by Harold Hotelling, "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources" is the authoritative piece of 
scholarship on this particular subject. It is the foundation upon which most, if not all, economic 
theory surrounding this subject has been built. For those reasons, a large portion of the following 
chapter has been formulated using information either directly from the article or sources focussed 
on the article itself. The aim of this chapter is to define the insight offered by the theory around the 
economics of depletion. Would any of what the theory offers significantly impact the direction a 
government could take on the question of nationalisation, as per its narrow definition stated in 
chapter 2. 
3.2 The Theory 
Theory suggests that exploitation industries with non-renewable resources, like all other industries, 
are most efficient when they function under conditions of pure competition. Hotelling states, and 
shows using a number of simplified mathematical tools, that under free competition (laissez faire) 
there is a tendency towards maximizing what can be referred to as the "social value of the resource" 
(1931: 143). Essentially, a competitive equilibrium maximises the sum of the discounted consumer-
plus-producer surpluses from the natural resources (Solow, 1974: 7). That said, it is important to 
pOint out that all equations hereunder referred to "measure the social value of the mine in the sense 
concerned with the total production of goods, but not properly its utility or the happiness to which it 
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benefit chiefly the poor than if they become articles of luxury" (Hotelling, 1931: 145). This important 
caveat is necessary to note because it has implication for government policy around the use of 
mineral resources after they have been expropriated from beneath the earth, regardless of the 
market structure under which they are exploited. It suggests that there is a possibility of increasing 
the actual utility derived from mineral resources once they are mined by restructuring the 
distribution of their beneficiaries, even if the mining industries are characterised by competitive 
conditions. 
There are a number of assumptions that Hotelling makes that are necessary to make laissez faire the 
most efficient market structure for mining industries. Chief amongst those assumptions for the 
natural resources industry is the availability of full information at the beginning of the exploitation 
process. Some of the other key assumptions made include the following: that the time path of the 
price of the resource is known, that the total amount of the resource that is available for 
exploitation is known, that the time of final exhaustion can be determined (Hotelling, 1931: 141) and 
that society wishes to discount future consumer surplus at the same rate that mine owners choose 
to discount their own future profits (Solow, 1974: 7). It is with this information that a quantity that 
maximises the social value of the resource can be calculated for every unit of time using the 
equation: 
Equation 1: 
u(q) = L'p(q) dq 
Source: Hotelling, 1931: 143 
Fisher (1981: 18) uses a simpler two period lagrangean approach to derive the time path of 
exhaustible resource prices. The equation, Pt = MC + [Po - MC][I + r]t (Fisher, 1981: 19) - where P is 
the net price received for the resource after paying the cost of extraction and placing it upon the 
market (this parallels Hotelling, 1931:141), MC is the marginal cost of extraction, r is the interest rate 
and t the time - shows that the price of a resource tends to become dominated by the royalty 
component as it draws away from the marginal cost of extraction at a rate that approaches the 
interest rate (Fisher, 1981: 18). Essentially, the price will keep rising indefinitely unless there is what 
some economists refer to as the backstop - tithe backstop is just a resources or a technology that 
can provide the same services as (the resource being exploited), but at a higher cost, and without 
risking exhaustion in any meaningful time frame" (Fisher, 1981: 18). If there is a backstop the price 
will only rise as far as the level at which the marginal cost of providing the backstop (MCb) sits and 
the equation becomes Pt = MC + (MCb - MC)/(1 + r)T-t (Fisher, 1981: 19), and the graph of the time 















Implicit in the equation and demonstrated in the graph is the assumption of a constant marginal cost 
of exploitation for both the resource in question and its backstop. This assumption can only hold if it 
is surrounded by more assumptions itself. For example there must be technological improvement 
every time period that makes it possible to exploit minerals deeper underground at the same cost, 
and there must be no switching costs for the technologies used. An accurate theory of market 
behaviour and optimal social policy must account for technological uncertainty (Solow, 1974: 6). 
The assumption of constant marginal costs for both the resource and the backstop also seems to 
contradict the idea that "various units of the mineral ... will be removed and used in order of 
accessibility, the most cheaply available first" (Hotelling, 1931: 140-1). That which is not obviously 
demonstrated by the equation, but is stated by Hotelling (1931) is the capital gains function which 
the net price path serves. The absence of dividends that can be drawn from minerals below the 
ground implies that the only way in which they can have capital gains and provide value for the Ti 
owners is through the net price increase of the actual resource. This increase in net price must 
happen at the rate of interest otherwise it causes a distortion in the production schedule of the 
mineral resources. If the net price rises at a slower rate than the interest rate then mine owners will 
frontload the extraction and exploit the mines at a faster rate than is desirable (thereby causing 
exhaustion sooner than desired). If the net price rises at a faster rate than the interest mining will be 
delayed for longer than it should because resources would be a brilliant way to hold wealth due to 
the supernormal capital gains that result (Solow, 1974: 3). 
Using some interest rate (III) we can use u(q) to find the present value (PV) of future enjoyment of 
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from a natural resource over its lifespan, given the (known) amount available in total. What 
Hotelling shows is that in the absence of externalities, and with all the conditions of perfect 
competition in place, competition can give a welfare optimum, not just in a static model, but also in 
a dynamic one. Competition in the mining sector does not necessarily lead to the pillaging of 
resources. On the contrary, it tends to lead to the most responsible usage of resources. This socially 
optimal value can be calculated using the equation: 
Equation 2: 
(Hotelling, 1931: 143) 
Equation 1 and 2 above simply show that free competition can be efficient even with non-renewable 
resources. The maximization problem of the resource industry can be solved under conditions of 
pure competition. The challenge of course is one of creating a situation in which free competition, in 
the true sense of the term, can thrive - so far not achieved anywhere in the world. How then can the 
resources industry be guided towards a production path that closely resembles one that would be 
achieved under conditions of free competition given the prevailing market imperfections. Some of 
these imperfections include negative externalities such as environmental degradation, pollution, 
monopolistic market structures, super profits that lead to distortions in investment patterns in the 
economy and information gaps (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007). 
Another important assumption made by Hotelling (1931: 145), so far taken for granted, that requires 
consideration is the idea that the market interest rate used by entrepreneurs can also be used to 
discount the future utility of resources not used today. There are a number of objections to this 
approach. Solow (1974: 8-9) points out a few of those objections. 
The first objection points to the fact that a lot of the risks that individuals would add into the 
discount rate which make the future riskier for them are not societal risks (Solow, 1974). For 
example security of tenure - the loss of a resource by one person (ownership) does not mean that 
the resource is lost to society. If the stated objections are indeed valid, as they appear to be, making 
the market interest rate an unacceptable discount rate for social value, then there has to be some 
other way of arriving at an acceptable discount rate for social benefit. Though some may disagree, 
the real argument is not so much around the question of whether society should be discounting 
future values of u(q) or not, because as Hotelling points out, future pleasures are uncertain and that 
Vand u(q) are concrete quantities, not mere symbols of pleasure (1931: 145). The question is at 
what interest rate those values should be discounted. 
The discount rate is important because its value can tilt the entire production schedule. Figure 2 
below shows three graphs derived using different rates to discount future utilities and graphing their 
present values assuming u(q)=lOO for every time period and T=lOO (table 1 in Appendix 1 contains 
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What we see from figure 2 above is that using 111=0.2, u(q)e-lllt falls below a value of one for the first 
time after twenty-four years, with 111=0.1 it happens after forty-seven years and when 111=0.05 it only 
dips below 1 after ninety-three years. This demonstrates the fact that a lower discount rate results in 
a production schedule that will lead to a longer lifespan for the mineral resource. Those who argue 
against the use of the market rate to discount future utility usually argue that the "market rate of 
interest exceeds the social rate of time preference" (Solow, 1974: 8). Some go as far as to say that 
the social rate should be zero because every generation should be treated equally. If their view be 
the most accurate then resources are being exploited too fast, and therefore exhausted too soon 
(Solow, 1974: 8). The implications of this difference in opinion are profound. 
If the market interest rate is too high, how then do we choose an appropriate discount rate for 
future utility? Since the intergenerational distribution of income or welfare depends on the provision 
that each successive generation makes for its successors, it must be that the choice of social 
discount rate is, in effect, a policy decision about the desired intergenerational distribution (Solow, 
1974: 10). Who then or how should the choice be made? That question is a difficult one to answer, 
but what we now know is that the choice is an important one and must be treated with the weight it 
deserves, and every possible and necessary consideration must be accounted for where possible to 
arrive at the social discount rate. The idea of intergenerational distribution of resources brings to the 
fore a need for long term thinking about the production schedule and the value of adequate 
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The important issue is the maximisation of the social value of the resources within an economy. The 
reason this is important to pOint out is the fact that there are those who could mistake a longer 
lifespan of resources as being the equivalent of increased social value, but that is not necessarily 
true. What we find for example, is that a resource mined under a monopolistic market structure is 
likely to last longer than it would if mined under conditions of pure competition. There are no 
welfare gains from the extension of the life of a mine. For example, if we were to assume isoelastic 
demand we would find that competitive firms and monopolies would essentially have the same 
extraction rate because the demand elasticity would be the same along the entire curve. Given the 
maximisation conditions in the two market structures, V (as in equation 2) for laissez faire and J (as 
in equation 3) for monopolies, we find that the duration of exploitation depends on whether p is 
finite or infinite in competitive markets and y' for monopolies (Hotelling, 1931: 151-2). 
Equation 3: 
Or 
(Hotelling, 1931: 150) 
To make the point clear, an equation showing the relationship between p and y' was derived. After 
some manipulation we find that y' = p + (dp/dq).q (Hotelling, 1931: 151), which makes y' a function 
of p. The results: if p is infinite then y' is infinite; if y' is finite then p is finite. The implications: if 
exploitation is infinite in a competitive market then it will be infinite where there is a monopoly; if 
exploitation is finite with a monopoly then it must be finite under competitive markets - therefore 
exploitation under monopolistic conditions lasts at least as long as exploitation under competitive 
conditions. Solow goes as far as to say that "a monopolist will exhaust a mine more slowly than a 
competitive industry facing the same demand curve would do" (1974: 8). 
This does not mean that monopolies bring about more utility to society. In fact, even with the above, 
pure competition still maximises the social value of a resource, whereas the monopoly simply 
maximises the profits of the monopolist. Under competitive markets the net price of the resource is 
expected to grow at the rate of the interest, under a monopoly structure it is the marginal profit 
(marginal revenue less marginal cost) that is expected to grow at the rate of the interest (Solow, 
1974: 3). This is an important conclusion: in Hotelling's world simply extending the life of a mine 
does not increase the utility it provides to society. What makes this conclusion important in this 
context is the fact that the South African mining tax is structured in a way that attempts to extend 
the life of mines in order to keep people in jobs. 
3.3 Implications of the Theory 
It would appear from the theory that more than all other things, the most important role that any 
government (or regulatory body) can play if it aims to maximise the social value of resources is foster 
conditions that increase the state of competition in the industry. If, however, the government aims 
to maximise social utility, it must first ensure that there is equality in the economy so that the use of 
one unit of a resource in any part of the economy holds the same value. After having ridden the 










If government cannot reduce inequality to negligible levels, it should aim to identify and legislate 
against externalities that are assumed away by economic theory, and ensure that the distribution of 
resources after they have been mined leans towards the poor, and are not used primarily for articles 
of luxury in economies with inequality. These interventions can range from super-taxes, royalty 
payments, community improvement projects by mining houses and in extreme cases nationalisation. 
4 General Overview of the South African Mining Industry 
4.1 Industry structure: 
The mining industry in South Africa is run under principles of private enterprise, and the State's 
influence is limited to mere regulation and promotion of stated goals like equal opportunity for all. 
For a long period of time the mining industry was dominated by five mining houses, each with a 
number of autonomous mining and other companies, which controlled most of the mining and 
mineral processing activities in the country (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, 1996). The 
implementation of the MPRDA and the Mining Charter has lead to increased partiCipation by 
historically disadvantaged individuals and groups in the mining industry, though not enough have 
benefitted from the industry to undo past injustices. 
Mining is South Africa's largest primary sector industry (Department of Mineral Resources, 2009). 
About fifty-three different metals were produced in South Africa from over one thousand five 
hundred mines in 2008 (Department of Mineral Resources, 2009). In the past underground rights 
could be privately held, and indeed could be held separately from surface rights. Currently, however, 
all mineral rights are vested in the State, a correction which was only made after the MPRDA was 
enacted in 2004 (Department of Minerals and Energy, 2003) 
South Africa holds some of the world's largest reserves; eighty-eight percent of the world's platinum 
group metals reserves, eighty percent of the world's manganese reserves and seventy-two percent 
of the world's chrome reserves (Department of Mineral Resources, 2009). These are reserves that 
the country is known to have without having made use of more modern exploration technologies so 
the potential for more discoveries is substantial. This means that the earning potential of the South 
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4.2 Economic significance of Mining Industry 
Figure 3: Mining industry's contribution to the economy 
% 







Source: South Africa. Department of Mineral Resources (1989-2009) 
The mining industry's contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has fluctuated around the eight 
percent of GDP figure for most of the period between 1992 and 2008 as illustrated in figure 3 above. 
The average annual contribution to GDP by the mining industry during this period was 7.5 percent. 
In Rand value terms, mining has contributed an average of R1 456 636 million to GDP per annum 
between 2002 and 2008. Its contribution to Fixed Capital Formation however, has been a little more 
erratic, going as high as 11.3 percent of GDP and dipping as low as 6.4 percent of GDP at various 
points over the same sixteen year period. The average annual contribution to fixed capital formation 
has been higher than that of GDP, at 9.1 percent per annum. In Rand terms this translates to an 
average figure of R179701 million per annum between 1992 and 2008 (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2009). 
The proportion of total national exports contributed by mineral resources dropped by almost 20% 
between 1992 and 2008 (Department of Mineral Resources, 2009). This figure peaked at almost fifty 
percent in 1993, dipping as low as twenty-nine percent in 2004 (Department of Minerals and Energy, 
2004). This remarkable drop is in no way due to a drop in the amount of resources exported by the 
industry, total export sales were on the increase throughout this period, it is more a result of the 
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An important aspect of the mining industry is its contribution to the government's budget in the 
form of tax revenue and other income. Total government revenue contributed by the mining 
industry increased by over R28.5 billion from 1992 to 2008, from a mere R1.5 billion to R30.08 billion 
in nominal terms (Department of Mineral Resources, 2009). This nineteen fold increase in actual 
revenue accruing to government from the mining industry has been accompanied by a decrease in 
the importance of mining industry revenue to the government as a percentage of total government 
revenue. When expressed in percentage terms, 2008 mining industry revenue only comprises 0.1 
percent of total government revenue, down from 13.1 percent in 1987 (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2009). Given that the actual amount contributed by the mining industry has only 
increased over time, the decline in its significance to the government coffers must be a result of 
improved revenue collection by the South African Revenue Services (SARS), a more diversified and 
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Figure 5: 











Source: South Africa. Department of Mineral Resources (1989-2009) 
















High unemployment is the big problem that most government strategies are trying to solve in South 
Africa. In 2008 the mining industry employed 2.9% of the total economically active population in the 
country (Department of Mineral Resources, 2009). The over 500000 people employed in the mining 
industry receive total remuneration of R60.876 billion, at an average salary of just over R117 000 per 
annum per employee (Department of Mineral Resources, 2009). The mining industry has managed 
to keep their rising remuneration bill between twenty and thirty percent of the total revenue of the 
industry for the roughly three decades long period between 1983 and 2008 (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2009). One of the ways in which the industry has managed to do this is by reducing the 
average number of people employed in the industry over time. The number of people employed in 
the industry has decreased by almost 200000 since the early 1990's (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2009). 
4.3 Beneficiation: 
"Beneficiation ... involves the transformation of a new material (through the production process) 
using local resources, to a more finished product, which has a higher value than the sale of the raw 
material for export," (South Africa. Department of Minerals and Energy, South A/rica's Mineral 
Industry report 2002/03, 2003: 16). 
Local beneficiation, which many believe could be the key to solving the unemployment problem in 
South Africa, has taken on a new energy since the new democratic dispensation came to power. The 
average growth in local and export sales of processed mineral products between 1994 and 2008 was 
twenty-two percent per annum. Even with this phenomenal growth in beneficiation in South Africa, 
there remains a lot of room for increased and improved beneficiation in South Africa. For one, as a 
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percent for the year 2008. Secondly, "South Africa is only at the first stage of beneficiation, 
characterised by capital intensive plants with low employment levels engaged in the production of 
mass intermediate products" (South Africa. Department of Minerals and Energy, South A/rica's 
Mineral Industry, 2003: 16). Of even more importance is the fact that much of the beneficiation that 
occurs in South Africa is energy intensive, for example smelting and rolling, which requires a lot of 
electricity. Beneficiation in South Africa is therefore characterised high capital costs, high energy 
usage and low labour intensity. 
Figure 6: 
- - Total processed mineral sales (nominal) 






























As can be seen from figure 6 above, there has been a steady increase in the actual sales volume (in 
R' 000 - nominal values) of processed minerals since about 1994. The annual percentage growth, 
however, was a little unstable in the first few years of the twenty-first century, but appears to have 
stabilized since around 2005. There is a lot to be done to ensure that more beneficiation occurs in 
South Africa, both qualitative and quantitative. The government is committed to the promotion of 
beneficiation, as is made clear in the MPRDA, where it is economically justifiable. 
5 African National Congress Youth League proposal: Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
5.1 Introduction 
No matter the position held on the question of the nationalisation of the mining sector, the ANCYL 
must be commended for having identified a wide perception that there is a problem with the 
distribution of the benefits accruing from the mining of resources in South Africa amongst the 
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this as a starting point the primary objective becomes finding a workable solution to that particular 
problem; a solution that will not retard the growth prospects of the Soutb African economy. 
5.2 Strengths of the Proposal 
5.2.1 
The ANCYL document gives a clear definition of what they consider to be the nationalisation of 
mines; "the democratic government's ownership and control of mining activities, including 
exploration, extraction, production, processing, trading and beneficiation of mineral resources in 
South Africa" (ANCYL, 2010: 2). 
Although far reaching, it is a comprehensive definition of what a nationalised mining industry would 
be according to the ANCYl. The matter to address is the desirability of such a state of affairs and 
what impact this would have on the economic fortunes of South Africans. Even more important to 
discuss is whether there exist alternative (and economically superior) solutions. 
5.2.2 
The ANCYL discussion paper contends that the South African economy is inadequately diversified. 
The primary reason cited for this is that it "has been based on the production and export of 
minerals" (ANCYL, 2010: 4). A majority of South Africa's industries are historically interlinked with 
the mining industry. The lack of diversification is partly due to two reasons. Firstly, little to no 
beneficiation of minerals takes place in South Africa and secondly local consumption of minerals for 
the development of the country is not prioritised by the mining industry, such that much of the 
minerals extracted from South African soil are sold to consumers outside the country (ANCYL, 2009). 
There therefore exists a need for the government to in some way direct the use of minerals 
extracted in South Africa (ANCYL, 2009). The MPRDA puts all the power in the hands of the holder of 
the right in question, to do what they want with the minerals they find in the land that they hold the 
right for; "Subject to this Act, any holder of a prospecting right, a mining right, exploration right or 
production right may ... remove and dispose of any such mineral found during the course or 
prospecting, mining, exploring or production, as the case may be" (MPRDA, 2002: 11). It is worth 
noting, however that the percentag  of total sales that is made up of local sales has steadily, albeit 
slowly, increased from fourteen percent in 1986 to twenty-eight percent in 2007 (Department of 
Minerals and Energy, 2008). This is insignificant as a share of GDP due to the much depressed share 
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Figure 7: Mineral Sales (Nominal) 
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5.2.3 
% 
The Youth League argue that the manner in which the mining industry has developed in South Africa 
has entrenched an unequal wealth distribution and led to uneven spatial development across the 
country. The dominance of a few monopolies in the South African mining industry ensures that the 
benefits of mining in South Africa only accrue to a small sub-section of the population. In their view 
the ownership of the mining industry by the states is one way to ensure that the benefits of mining 
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huge effort to substantially decrease inequality in the country. This, they argue, can only happen if 
the monopoly stranglehold of the South African mining houses is released and new, formerly 
disadvantaged, entrants are able to penetrate the industry (ANCYL, 2009). 
On the other hand, the MPRDA gives the Minister of Minerals and Energy the power to "facilitate 
assistance to any historically disadvantaged person to conduct prospecting or mining operations" 
(MPRDA, 2002: 13), taking into account their financial position before extending the assistance. The 
Act also tasks the minister to develop a broad-based socio-economic empowerment charter (the 
Mining Charter) so as to achieve the government's goals of redressing, social and economic 
inequalities. The Mining Charter is meant to "set the framework, targets and time-table for effecting 
the entry of historically disadvantaged South Africans into the mining industry, and allow [them] to 
benefit from the exploitation of mining and mineral resources" (MPRDA, 2002: 43). The limitation is 
that the structure and manner in which historically disadvantaged persons are supposed to access 
this assistance is not made very clear in the Act. 
The Mining Charter has been developed. In its vision it states that it is "in the pursuit of a shared 
vision of a globally competitive mining industry ... [and] to create an industry that will proudly reflect 
the promise of a non-racial South Africa" (The Mining Charter, 2002: 1) that the actions and 
commitments within it are set out. The Charter contains quite specific targets for the transformation 
of the mining industry, but ANCYL suggest that the targets are not far-reaching enough to ensure 
that the benefits of the mining industry accrue to a broad group within South Africa. If anything, 
they say, these seem to be set out in a manner that will reinforce the dominance of a small elite, 
albeit of a different racial group. 
5.2.4 
Uneven spatial development is another matter raised by the ANCYL. The extent of the unevenness of 
spatial development in South Africa is best captured in the following assertion: 
"26 locations represent the engine of the South African economy, home to 77% of all people living 
under minimum living level in the country, 84% of the total population and generating 95% of the 
national Gross Value Added" (ANCYL discussion document, 2009: 17). 
This is the kind of impact that the inequality that is reinforced by income patterns established by the 
skewed distribution of the benefits of the mining industry, and the wider South African economy, 
has had on the spatial development in South Africa. They suggest that the only mining town that has 
been able to develop beyond its mining activities is Johannesburg, while all the others are subject 
only to primary mining activities with little to no development of other industries taking place within 
their boundaries (ANCYL, 2009). Though it could be argued that Ekurhuleni and Durban have their 
roots in mining activity as well, the point is that only a few mining towns have developed beyond 
their mines. On the strength of this assertion, the ANCYL suggests that mineral-centred Industrial 
Development Zones should be created in the locales where mining is taking place, but high levels of 
poverty and unemployment persist (ANCYL, 2009) is not a bad one, though a lot more detail on how 
they would work is necessary. The strength of the ANCYL document is its identification of the uneven 
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5.2.5 
The ANCYL discussion document correctly points out the fact that mining in South Africa has become 
increasingly capital intensive, and that this may be contributing to the ever growing unemployment 
problem in the country. As the graph in figure 8 below shows, the total number of people employed 
in the primary mining industry steadily dropped between 1986 and 2001 before rising again a little 
bit between 2002 and 2008. 
Figure 8: Employment in Mining (1983-2009) 
% - As percentage of total economically active population Average number employed 
9 800 
.... 
8 700 , 
7 600 -.... 
500 
5 
\ "' .... 








11,.'»'b'? '),~'b<' '),~'b1 '),~'b~ '),~~'), '),~~'? '),~~<, '),~~1 '),~~~ 1-,;;§;j'), 1-00'? 1-00<' 1-001 
Year 








The absence of any significant beneficiation of minerals in the country means that the loss of jobs in 
the primary mining sector is not in any way compensated for by the creation of jobs at secondary or 
tertiary levels of the industry. What the discussion document fails to account for is the efficiency 
gains that have lead to the loss of jobs in the primary sector. The reduced number of workers in the 
industry has been able to increase production throughout the period between 1986 and 2007, which 
means the industry has managed to increase the per worker production figures. In addition to these 
efficiency gains, it is widely accepted that South African mines are running far deeper now and are 
almost mined out, which also increases the job shedding rate. 
5.2.6 
The document proposes that it is important to find a way that beneficiation of minerals mined in 
South Africa and elsewhere in the world can be done in South Africa, such that what is exported 
from here already has close to maximum value added to it, and it is not just the primary 
commodities being exported. Two obvious reasons for this; first is the job creation aspect it would 
bring and second would be the economic growth it would lead to. However, the MPRDA already 
empowers the Minister of Minerals and Energy to promote the economic beneficiation of minerals 










after written notice and consultation with the Minister (MPRDA, 2002). The Minister of Minerals and 
Energy also has the power: 
"to make regulations regarding ... the exploitation, processing, utilization or use of or the disposal 
of any mineral; ... [to prohibit] the disposal of any mineral and the use thereof for any specified 
purpose or in any specified manner or for any other purpose or in any other manner than a specified 
purpose or manner; [and authorise] the restriction or regulation in respect of the disposal or use of 
any mineral in general" (MPRDA, 2002: 45-46). 
This gives some scope for the possibility of minerals being beneficiated in South Africa and creating 
the jobs needed to improve the employment problem in the country, on the grounds that the 
enforcement of local beneficiation must be done at a point when it is economically efficient to do so. 
This makes sense for a 'normal' State. Once the idea of a development State is brought into the 
pi'Cture it becomes a lot less clear. If South Africa is indeed a developmental state then an argument 
could be made for the promotion of beneficiation projects that are not necessarily economically 
efficient right now, with the hope that the industry will develop its own momentum and with 
eventual economies of scale and scope, become globally competitive. Before that can happen, the 
debate on the developmental state must be settled. 
5.3 Weaknesses of the proposal: 
5.3.1 
Although a comprehensive definition of nationalisation is given in the discussion document, the form 
which it would take is left undefined. Various options of what the form could be are put forward: " .. 
. nationalisation, like its opposite, privatisation, can assume various forms: it can be 100% public 
ownership, or 51% or more owned by the state, or established through partnership arrangements 
with the private sector in which the state assumes greater control" (ANCYL, 2009: 3). The discussion 
document also fails to establish a position on whether the expropriation of privately owned mines 
would be with or without compensation, stating that it could be either one or the other, depending 
on the merits of each case (ANCYL, 2009). The deeper challenge is the absence of clear guidelines 
showing which mines ought to be expropriated with compensation and which ones should not, 
leaving the system wide open for abuse. The problem with this is that it leaves room for uncertainty 
and can create panic within the community of mine owners and investors in the industry. Clarity 
about the process is crucial for the success of nationalisation programmes (Coleman, 1991: 41). 
The absence of a clear position on compensation within the ANCYL document is made to appear 
even worse by the fact that the MPRDA gives the Minister of Minerals and Energy the power to, "in 
accordance with section 25(2) of the Constitution, expropriate any land or any right therein and pay 
compensation in respect thereof' (MPRDA, 2002: 30). It being expropriated in accordance with 
section 25(2) of the Constitution means that it must be expropriated "for a public purpose or in the 
public interest" (The Constitution of South Africa, 1996). According to section 25(4) of the South 
African constitution the public interest includes: "the nation's commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources natural resources" 
(The Constitution of South Africa, 1996). Basically, the current laws and regulations already grant 
concession for the expropriation of mining rights, but the holders must be compensated. An 
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done in cases where it is for a public purpose or interest. This achieves the same objective without 
causing panic in the economy. 
5.3.2 
As part of the nationalisation strategy, the ANCYL proposed the formation of a state mining 
company that would take over the operations of Alexkor, the State Diamond producer and trader, 
and take control of all state shares in mining activities in the country. The weakness about the 
formation of this entity as envisioned by the ANCYL is that it lacks a clear overarching objective that 
it would be mandated to achieve. The absence of one clear objective will probably lead to a tug of 
war, with one group pulling in one direction and another group pulling in another. Its objectives are 
given as job creation, maximisation of the country's gain from mineral resources, contribution to 
socio-economic development and assistance of communities where mining happens (ANCYL 
discussion document, 2009: 19). Not only are the goals numerous, they are unclear and almost 
immeasurable. 
5.3.3 
The biggest weakness with the ANCYL discussion paper is its inability to make a connection between 
the problems it does so well to identify and the manner in which the suggested solution, 
nationalisation of the mining industry, will solve them. Though nationalisation is the ANCYL's chosen 
tool to address the problems identified, it has never detailed how it will address them. No other 
possible alternative is explored in the ANCYL discussion document, what makes nationalisation 
better than any other tool is not detailed in the discussion docum nt. 
6 Conclusion 
6.1 Increasing the State's Fiscal Capacity 
The main driver of poverty and inequality reduction in South Africa since the dawn of democracy in 
the country has been the government. The government has, through various laws and budgetary 
means, driven the process of income redistribution and increasing equal access to opportunities, 
spending R89 billion on social grants alone and R165 billion on education in the 2010/11 financial 
year (Gordhan, 2010). Though the success of government has been limited, there has been a bigger 
push by government to champion poverty reduction and equality, even with limited resources, than 
by the private sector. The argument therefore would be that if more resources were to be handed to 
government, the poverty reduction process could be a lot faster. The counter to it is that if 
government is failing to use the resources it currently has effectively and efficiently then there is no 
reason that having more would lead to improvements. The fact that government employs almost 
25% of South Africa's workforce suggests that it is already too big and at risk of crowding out the 
private sector if it were expanded any further. The focus should be on creating an environment 
within which the private sector can create more descent jobs. 
Between 1994 and 2008 government received a total Rl09.267 billion in revenue from the mining 
industry in the form of taxes and export duties (Department of Mineral Resources, 2009). Taking the 
remuneration figures given by the Department of Mineral Resources for mining industry employees 
and how big a percentage of revenue they make up, figures for total mining revenue were calculated 
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thirty and forty percent of total revenue, figures for mining profits were calculated. Assuming 
government ownership of 51% of the mining industry at large, the amount of income that could 
have accrued to government between 1994 and 2008, at those various profit levels, was calculated. 
What was found, as can be seen in Table 1, is that even at a mere ten percent of mining industry 
revenue, the profits that could have accrued to government if the State owned 51% of the mining 
industry over that period came to R91.924 billion, only R17.343 billion short of what government 
amassed in taxes and export duties from the industry over the same period. When the profit level of 
the mining industry is assumed to be twenty percent of total mining industry revenues, the income 
accruing to government jumps to a staggering R187.525 billion, outstripping government tax and 
export duty revenue by R78.258 billion. If the profit levels of the mining industry are at forty percent 
of total revenue, then government would have garnered R375.050 billion, a sum that is more than 
forty percent of the consolidated budget of government for the year 2010/11 (Gordhan, 2010). 
From the table below it can be seen that the flow of revenue to government from mining profits 
(had they held a 51% stake in the industry) would have been more than R20 billion per annum from 
the year 2001 - at a 20% of revenue profit level. The significance of these numbers becomes more 
pronounced when the size of certain important government expenditure figures are highlighted. For 
example, R52 billion was set aside for various public works projects over a three year period 
(Gordhan, 2010). With this figure in mind, a R187 billion boost in revenue for government takes on a 
new meaning. 
Assuming, as the Department of mineral resources does, that production and sales will increase 
going forward, the argument for increased State ownership of the mining industry, on the basis of 
trying to increase government revenue, cannot be faulted. If the trend is anything to go by, the 
revenue of the mining industry will increase substantially over the next decade. What is important to 
note at this point is the fact that government ownership would be limited to being a majority 
shareholder and allowing all other things to run as they do in the mining industry at the moment. 
That failing, no guarantees can be made about the manner in which the industry will develop going 
forward. Essentially, nationalization will be most useful for government if it is permitted to develop 
in a manner that permits the private sector business model to continue. If it is run in a way that 
prioritises other things and "not in order to maximise profits" (ANCYL, 2009: 7) as the ANCYL 
suggests, it might not be as successful as it is needed to be. From the "Economics of Depletion" 
chapter above, what is important to realise is that Hotelling's model and findings are set within a 
dynamic setting - would nationalisation still hold in a dynamic setting within which all factors vary in 
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Table 1: 
Total 
As % of total Total 
Mining profits Year mining Mining 
Remuneration 
revenue Revenue 
Nominal 10% of rev 20% of rev 30% of rev 40% of rev 
R'million % R'million R'million 
1983 3569 21.9 16297 1630 3259 4889 6519 
1984 4141 21.7 19083 1908 3817 5725 7633 
1985 4853 18.7 25952 2595 5190 7786 10381 
1986 5784 19.6 29510 2951 5902 8853 11804 
1987 6916 24.1 28697 2870 5739 8609 11479 
1988 7915 23.5 33681 3368 6736 10104 13472 
1989 9055 24.1 37573 3757 7515 11272 15029 
1990 11182 29.4 38034 3803 7607 11410 15214 
1991 12621 29.1 43371 4337 8674 13011 17348 
1992 12656 30 42187 4219 8437 12656 16875 
1993 12827 27.4 46814 4681 9363 14044 18726 
1994 13641 26.9 50710 5071 10142 15213 20284 
1995 15485 28.1 55107 5511 11021 16532 22043 
1996 16885 26.8 63004 6300 12601 18901 25201 
1997 18644 27.9 66824 6682 13365 20047 26730 
1998 19240 27 71259 7126 14252 21378 28504 
1999 20138 26.3 76570 7657 15314 22971 30628 
2000 22127 22.5 98342 9834 19668 29503 39337 
2001 24409 21.2 115137 11514 23027 34541 46055 
2002 26406 19.3 136819 13682 27364 41046 54727 
2003 30801 26 118465 11847 23693 35540 47386 










39 I P age 
2005 36682 25.7 142732 14273 28546 42819 57093 
2006 38989 20.1 193975 19398 38795 58193 77590 
2007 50072 22.3 224538 22454 44908 67361 89815 
2008 60876 20.3 299882 29988 59976 89965 119953 
Total: 1994 - 2008 183848 367696 551544 735392 
51% of Total 91924 187525 281287 375050 
The additional income that would flow to the government budget that would come from the 
additional revenue earned in the form of dividends from the mining industry could be used to invest 
in beneficiation initiatives in the country. It would make it possible for the government to more than 
just promote the idea of beneficiation at a secondary and tertiary level. It would give the 
government the means by which to implement their strategy. The increase in local beneficiation, as 
has been stated elsewhere, would most likely lead to a decrease in unemployment which would 
directly impact the poverty levels in the country. 
The statement was made above that it is important to determine whether state ownership would 
enhance that industry's ability to contribute to the achievement of poverty and inequality reducing 
economic growth. Based on the table above, it is clear that a 51% ownership of the mining industry 
would greatly enhance the State's ability to fund projects that would lead to faster poverty 
reduction and ensuring equality amongst South Africans. Bearing the fact that the government has 
done more to achieve these two goals than the private sector appears willing to do, it is tempting to 
agree with the idea that the increased flow of profits within the mining industry to the government 
would enhance the mining industry's ability to contribute towards the achievement of poverty and 
inequality reducing growth. In theory all that is left to determine is the best way to ensure that the 
super profits flow to the government, ownership or regulation? Unfortunately this only holds in a 
model in which all that changes is the government stake in the mining industry. Once other 
dynamics come into play - the cost of acquiring its shareholding, the impact on local investment and 
FOI, the profitability of nationalised mines etc. - the model near well collapses. Acquiring a 51% 
stake in Anglo-Gold Ashanti alone would cost the government R269 163419613.57 (The market cap 
of Anglo-Gold Ashanti is R527 771411 007 (Standard Bank, 2011) - over R500 billion) at the current 
market cap of the company. 
6.2 Transforming the Accumulation Path 
The "social value of the resource, [when defined as] utility or the happiness to which it leads for a 
society ... depends upon the distribution of wealth, and is greater if the products of the mine 
benefit chiefly the poor than if they become articles of luxury" (Hotelling, 1931: 145). Although free 
competition tends to maximise the total production of goods within the mining industry (Hotelling, 
1931: 143), it does not necessarily maximise the utility derived from the mining industry within an 











There are essentially two areas of focus for a government within the resource market that could 
assist in increasing the social utility derived from the exploitation of exhaustible resources. The first 
area is the production schedule of the resources and the factors that influence it. As seen thus far, 
the production schedule gives the maximum social value of the resource when it is determined 
within a competitive market. This means that the best thing a government can do to get the 
maximum possible social benefit from mining industries is to foster conditions of pure competition. 
The second area is the distribution of the benefits of resources once they have been mined or 
extracted. Utility increases if resources are being directed to areas of need for the poor instead of 
going to the production of luxury goods. 
In order to know what needs to be done to make the resources market competitive, it is important 
that we know what assumptions are made in economic theory about the condition of perfect 
competition. Most principles texts (e.g. Lipsey and Chrystal 2007), describe perfect competition as a 
situation in which the following assumptions hold: 
There are many buyers and many sellers in the market, none of whom can influence the market 
demand or supply 
• All firms sell a homogenous product 
• Each firm is a price taker 
• There is perfect mobility of resources, i.e. free entry and exit is possible 
• There is perfect information available to both buyers and sellers 
There are also assumptions made by theorists in the exhaustible resources economics field that are 
specific to ensuring a competitive equilibrium in the mining industry. These include: 
• Society discounts future enjoyment of resources at the same rate that mine owners discount 
their profits 
• Net prices rise at the rate of interest, independently of what mine owners do 
• The size of the ore body is known from the start 
The conditions needed in order for these assumptions to becoming the reality are near impossible to 
create. This makes pure competition near impossible to have. In South Africa especially, there exists 
a number of "price distorting monopolies" (Hotelling, 1931: 138) and given the depths at which 
some of the minerals are mined, there certainly isn't homogeneity of product. Given the above, the 
government's focus must therefore be on the distribution of the benefits of mining so as to 
maximise the utility derived from them. This requires the transformation of the accumulation path 
of South Africa from one that consolidates wealth within a group of a few, to one that ensures that 
the majority can benefit from all economic activity. 
If the ideal conditions of competition were present in industries where the exploitation of natural 
resources occurs, laissez faire would lead to the production of a maximum social value of the 
resources exploited. "However, there are in extractive industries discrepancies from our assumed 
conditions leading to particularly wasteful forms of exploitation which might well be regulated in the 
public interest" (Hotelling, 1931: 144). The South African mining industry is not maximising the social 
value of resources because it has been and continues to be dominated by a few big companies, 
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the industry, the conditions actually prevailing are likely to be far removed from the ideal situation 
spoken about in economic theory (Hotelling, 1931). Herein lies a possible motivation for the 
nationalisation of the mining industry. If the current market structure in the mining industry is not 
conducive of a social maximum, then it could be possible that transferring the ownership of the 
industry to government could lead to a better use of minerals, directing the benefits more to the 
poor than the rich, and thereby increasing the social value of resources. As it stands, the market 
structure is distorted and only a select few (who are already rich) are benefitting from the mining 
industry so the social value of South Africa's minerals is way below its potential value. 
6.3 To Nationalise or Not to Nationalise 
The MPRDA defines all South Africans in a manner that includes future generations as well (MPRDA, 
2002). This puts additional responsibility on the government to safeguard the mineral resources of 
South Africa for future generations as well. Intergenerational equality is made important by the 
definition of all South Africans given in the MPRDA. As we have seen from the theory on the 
economics of depletion (chapter 3) the choice of discount rate becomes very important when future 
generations are brought into play. What we find is that both the private sector and government are 
placed under pressure to discount the distant future quite highly for two different reasons, quarterly 
reports and elections respectively. Who then is best placed to choose a discount rate that will be 
closest to zero and safeguard the interests of future generations in the currently available mineral 
resources? This is but one thing to consider when deciding who should have ownership over the 
nation's mineral resources. 
Direct participation in the mineral resources industry by the majority of the nation's living 
population is difficult to ensure because of the various barriers to entry into the industry, the biggest 
of which is financing. Knowing this, it is eVident that the only way for the majority to benefit from 
the mining industry is if the government plays its role of representing the people and using its 
revenue to create a better life for all. The creation of this better life must entail two elements: using 
the profits of the mining industry to develop the nation and using the actual minerals themselves in 
the development process of the country by prioritising South African mineral resource needs above 
export sales. 
Would nationalising the South African mining industry enhance its ability to contribute to the 
achievement of poverty and inequality reducing economic growth? If we assumed that the 
government could simply be handed 51% of the mining industry without disrupting the status quo 
(in terms of productivity, investment activity and growth) then the answer is a resounding yes. 
Nationalising the mining industry would increase the government's revenue if the government did 
not have to pay to nationalise it - assuming that the mining industry would still be taxed in the same 
way it is currently being taxed, and the mining industry profits would be additional revenue to the 
tax revenue already generated from the industry by government. This revenue could be used to 
improve spatial development in areas where mining occurs, but poverty persists, fund beneficiation 
projects around the country, thereby creating new jobs and reducing inequality in South Africa. If 
the government buys its share of the mining industry then there will be little to no net gain in terms 
of revenue. Assuming that the price they pay is the market price (which is the present value of the 
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and resource consuming process that will simply shift income from private hands to government. 
Acquiring 51% of just one Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) listed company would cost 
R269 163419613.57, just over RlO billion more than what the government would have made 
between 1994 and 2008 (at a 30% of revenue profit level) from the mining industry if it owned a 51% 
stake in the entire mining industry. In addition to the cost, there is also the question of whether 
nationalised mining industry would run well enough to ensure that the revenue actually generated 
and flows to the government. The "Iootability" of mining industries, as pointed out by Netshitenzhe 
(2010), is a real issue of concern. 
The one way that looting could be avoided is through the establishment of private-public 
partnerships in which the government takes a significant equity stake in mining activities across the 
mining industry's value-chain without being fully responsible for the decision making and the day-to-
day running of the mines. All things considered, nationalisation does not seem like an economically 
viable or sustainable option for the South African government. 
The truth of the matter is that "considerations of efficiency are but one small basis of decision 
[making] and often relatively minor at that" (Rawls, 1971: 260). The restoration of justice should also 
be a big factor in the decision to either nationalise or not to nationalise. On the one hand, if mines 
and mining rights can be justly expropriated by the government, then efficiency of the mining 
industry could probably be guaranteed. This, however, raises the question of what just expropriation 
would be, how much it would cost the government and whether government can afford it or not. 
On the other hand, justice is also important when considering the millions of South Africans who 
have been systematically excluded from the economy and its benefits over time. If nationalising the 
mining industry can restore justice to those people then it is an imperative that the government 
must pursue. The failure to restore justice in South African society will lead to eventual instability 
(Rawls, 1971). The evidence seems to suggest that there are other, less costly and more efficient 











7.1 Appendix 1: Additional Tables 
Table 1: Time Path 
t u(q) 111=0.05 PVo.os 111=0.1 
0 100 0.05 100.00 0.1 
1 100 0.05 95.12 0.1 
2 100 0.05 90.48 0.1 
3 100 0.05 86.07 0.1 
4 100 0.05 81.87 0.1 
5 100 0.05 77.88 0.1 
6 100 0.05 74.08 0.1 
7 100 0.05 70.47 0.1 
8 100 0.05 67.03 0.1 
9 100 0.05 63.76 0.1 
10 100 0.05 60.65 0.1 
11 100 0.05 57.69 0.1 
12 100 0.05 54.88 0.1 
13 100 0.05 52.20 0.1 
14 100 0.05 49.66 0.1 
15 100 0.05 47.24 0.1 
16 100 0.05 44.93 0.1 
17 100 0.05 42.74 0.1 
18 100 0.05 40.66 0.1 
19 100 0.05 38.67 0.1 
PVO.1 111=0.2 PVO.2 
100.00 0.2 100.00 
90.48 0.2 81.87 
81.87 0.2 67.03 
74.08 0.2 54.88 
67.03 0.2 44.93 
60.65 0.2 36.79 
54.88 0.2 30.12 
49.66 0.2 24.66 
44.93 0.2 20.19 
40.66 0.2 16.53 
36.79 0.2 13.53 
33.29 0.2 11.08 
30.12 0.2 9.07 
27.25 0.2 7.43 
24.66 0.2 6.08 
22.31 0.2 4.98 
20.19 0.2 4.08 
18.27 0.2 3.34 
16.53 0.2 2.73 
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20 100 0.05 36.79 0.1 13.53 0.2 1.83 
21 100 0.05 34.99 0.1 12.25 0.2 1.50 
22 100 0.05 33.29 0.1 11.08 0.2 1.23 
23 100 0.05 31.66 0.1 10.03 0.2 1.01 
24 100 0.05 30.12 0.1 9.07 0.2 0.82 
25 100 0.05 28.65 0.1 8.21 0.2 0.67 
26 100 0.05 27.25 0.1 7.43 0.2 0.55 
27 100 0.05 25.92 0.1 6.72 0.2 0.45 
28 100 0.05 24.66 0.1 6.08 0.2 0.37 
29 100 0.05 23.46 0.1 5.50 0.2 0.30 
30 100 0.05 22.31 0.1 4.98 0.2 0.25 
Table 2: Mineral Sales 
Mineral Sales 
local sales Export sales local as % Export as 
Year (FOR) (FOB) Total sales of Total % of Total 
1989 7722911009 29763826424 37486737433 21% 79% 
1990 8346508834 29704178384 38050687218 22% 78% 
1991 9088592646 34297599022 43386191668 21% 79% 
1992 9049509722 33057185537 42106695259 21% 79% 
1993 9871730941 40347742930 50219473871 20% 80% 
1994 10786122253 42817337762 53603460015 20% 80% 
1995 12424126917 44145295178 56569422095 22% 78% 
1996 13814513118 51294439977 65108953095 21% 79% 
1997 14362761673 51707835420 66070597093 22% 78% 
1998 15466759170 55294603758 70761362928 22% 78% 
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2000 22067934938 76304233144 98372168082 22% 78% 
2001 25235294981 89943815166 115179110147 22% 78% 
2002 27437822653 107327387999 134765210652 20% 80% 
2003 30940471686 86809436374 1177 49908060 26% 74% 
2004 35633700569 89673167730 125306868299 28% 72% 
2005 40903727369 101905943133 142809670502 29% 71% 
2006 56140955000 137448545000 193589500000 29% 71% 
2007 62107451835 161755698930 223863150765 28% 72% 
2008 80720893166 219593797676 300314690842 27% 73% 
Source: South Africa. Department of Mineral Resources (1989-2009) 
Table 3: Economic Contribution of Mining Industry 
Contribution to Value Contribution to Fixed Contribution to national 
Added Capital Formation (FCF) total exports of goods 
National Total Total 
Year From mining From mining From Mining 
GDP FCF exports 
R' R' R' R' R' R' 
% % % 
million million million million million million 
1992 343554 26575 7.7 58255 6448 11.1 69837 33062 47.4 
1993 390842 30052 7.7 62601 5203 8.3 80877 40348 49.9 
1994 440147 32111 7.3 73045 6602 9 93536 42817 45.8 
1995 500354 34830 7 87042 7397 8.5 lE+05 44145 40.5 
1996 565470 38768 6.9 lE+05 8003 8 1E+05 50691 38.9 
1997 627167 40524 6.5 lE+05 9638 8.5 1E+05 51708 36 
1998 674874 45879 6.8 lE+05 11317 8.9 2E+05 55295 34.4 
1999 738873 52173 7.1 lE+05 11635 9.2 2E+05 58303 33.4 
2000 838218 63391 7.6 1E+05 13847 9.9 2E+05 76304 34.4 










2002 1063801 92113 8.7 2E+05 19802 11.3 3E+05 1E+05 32.8 
2003 1143679 84258 7.4 2E+05 21706 10.8 3E+05 86747 29.9 
2004 1250953 89290 7.1 2E+05 14223 8 3E+05 89673 28.9 
2005 1372374 103012 7.3 2E+05 12365 6.4 4E+05 1E+05 29.3 
2006 1543938 119365 7.7 3E+05 26302 8.1 4E+05 1E+05 31.9 
2007 1768220 135549 7.7 4E+05 36618 8.9 5E+05 2E+05 30.2 
2008 2053487 196094 9.5 5E+05 47851 9 7E+05 2E+05 30.8 
Source: South Africa. Department of Minerai Resources (1989-2009) 
Table 4: State Revenue from Mining Industry 
STATE REVENUE FROM MINING 
Year 
State share of profits and Total 
As % f 
ended 31 
Mining 
State Aid Total State 
Taxation Diamond Exports Duties Revenue 
Mar Revenue 
R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO % R'OOO 
1983 1478240 415171 1893411 11 56275 
1984 1852696 597705 2450401 12.9 34950 
1985 1823306 425715 2249021 9.5 54904 
1986 2938065 694230 3632295 12.3 34325 
1987 3450161 897852 4348013 13.1 31450 
1988 2837710 729984 3567694 9.5 26535 
1989 2552071 647157 3199228 6.7 29757 
1990 2273605 546604 2820209 4.4 49894 
1991 2201059 438128 2639187 3.8 55267 
1992 1236158 346425 1582583 2.1 48443 
1993 884497 217355 1101852 1.4 41818 
1994 1011192 326152 1337344 1.4 20855 










"+1 I r cl to e 
1996 1608455 217078 1825553 1.4 43239 
1997 1849253 146427 1995680 1.4 36404 
1998 1681851 157620 1839470 1.1 29999 
1999 2134737 57715 2190452 1.2 29499 
2000 1072047 120083 1192130 0.6 27990 
2001 4499248 452903 4952151 2.3 34939 
2002 8885713 169313 9055026 3.5 28914 
2003 6850764 1034702 7885467 0.3 20349 
2004 3300975 421793 3722769 0.9 32530 
2005 4906497 1435487 6341984 1 36225 
2006 1391208 888259 14800317 0.3 37339 
2007 19372616 897679 20270296 0.1 24139 
2008 29254971 834154 30089125 0.1 21000 
Source: South Africa. Department of Mineral Resources (1989-2009) 
Table 5: Mining Industry Employment 
Mining Industry Employment Figures 
Average As percentage of Remuneration As percentage 
Total 
Year number total conomically Per worker of total mining 
Remuneration 
employed active population per annum revenue 
Nominal Nominal 
% R'million R % 
1983 692453 7.3 3569 5154 21.9 
1984 711832 7.3 4141 5817 21.7 
1985 735163 8.5 4853 6602 18.7 
1986 756201 7.4 5784 7649 19.6 
1987 749713 7.2 6916 9225 24.1 










--- I ..... 0 ...... 
1991 5128147 
1992 4890089 -5% 
1993 5271373 8% 
1994 6962800 32% 
1995 9434116 35% 
1996 12798520 36% 
1997 16381543 28% 
1998 17484117 7% 
1999 18216900 4% 
2000 22597727 24% 
2001 24537886 9% 
2002 30893557 26% 
2003 27791129 -10% 
2004 35409442 27% 
2005 37525518 6% 
2006 43384659 16% 
2007 54759231 26% 
2008 86067263 57% 
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7.2 Appendix 2: Additional Graphs 
Graph 1: 
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